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The primary obstacle to analyzing the political and educational statements found in 
eighteenth-century women’s fiction is that all texts, fictional or not, were subject to 
intense scrutiny by the dominant culture, which disallowed women a political voice; 
therefore, most political or educational arguments authored by women are heavily 
obscured. This thesis seeks to contextualize female quixotic texts—namely Charlotte 
Lennox’s The Female Quixote and Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey—within the long 
eighteenth-century’s educational debates and to analyze each text’s veiled advocation for 
female learning. In so doing, John Locke’s notions concerning the tabula rasa, the 
conduct of the mind, and education are paramount because female writers, including 
Lennox and Austen, appropriated his individualistic theories to advocate for intellectual 
parity. When viewing the female quixotic tradition as a dialogue between female authors 
and contemporary educational debates, both The Female Quixote and Northanger Abbey 
signify an emerging ideology that both presents the flaws inherent in gendered education 
and also calls for more equitable female learning.  
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More generally, this sense of 'an ideology' is applied in abstract ways to the actual 
consciousness of both dominant and subordinated classes. A dominant class 'has' this 
ideology in relatively pure and simple forms. A subordinate class has, in one version, 
nothing but this ideology as its consciousness (since the production of all ideas is, by 
axiomatic definition, in the hands of those who control the primary means of production) 
or, to another version, has this ideology imposed on its otherwise different consciousness, 
which it must struggle to sustain or develop against 'ruling-class ideology.'1 
     Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, 1977 
 
 
In former times, the pen, like the sword, was considered as consigned by nature to the 
hands of men; the ladies contented themselves with private virtues and domestick 
excellence; and a female writer, like a female warrior, was considered as a kind of 
eccentrick being, that deviated, however illustriously, from her due sphere of motion 
…the revolution of years has now produced a generation of Amazons of the pen, who 
with the spirit of their predecessors have set masculine tyranny at defiance, asserted their 
claim to the regions of science, and seem resolved to contest the usurpations of virility. 
Samuel Johnson, The Adventurer No. 115, 
“The Itch of Writing Universal,” 1753 
 
                                                                                                                                             
As simply observed by Samuel Johnson in his Life of Pope, “the purpose of a 
writer is to be read” (746).  However, in the past, the scholarly “reading” of the 
eighteenth century has too often placed primary sources by female authors into 
purposeless obscurity. Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote (1752), for instance, was 
not studied by literary critics until 1970, when it was first republished after a hundred and 
fifty years of neglect, whereas male-authored novels like Tom Jones and Pamela have 
consistently been reprinted both for mass consumption and as authoritative texts. In an 
attempt to acknowledge the literary contributions of female writers like Mary Astell, 
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, Charlotte Lennox, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Jane Austen, 
the last half-century has elicited a dramatic upturn in scholarship dedicated to “[restoring] 
                                                             
1 Emphasis my own.  
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women’s voices to the canon of British Literature” (Bowers 53).  Where once the 
eighteenth-century canon centered on the male authorship of Defoe, Richardson and 
Fielding—as enshrined in works like Ian Watt’s 1957 Rise of the Novel—now women 
like Lennox and Austen hold a place of prominence. Because of this refocusing of critical 
intention and attention, the current academic conversation features a cultivated interest in 
eighteenth-century women and the political debates with which they were implicitly and 
explicitly involved. Though scholars have traditionally analyzed the canonical issues 
present in women’s writing, the evolving critical commentary has elicited a 
multidimensional approach that both acknowledges and explores the fundamental 
problem of women’s literacy within female-authored texts—thus, enabling a critical 
study of the complex reciprocal relationship between gender roles, reading, and education 
in Lennox’s The Female Quixote and Austen’s Northanger Abbey.  
As a result of this refocused critical attention, recent scholarship has emphasized 
that during the eighteenth century, the education, and more specifically the literary 
learning, of women was a particularly ubiquitous and divisive issue that reached the scale 
of national import. In her all-encompassing book Women’s Reading in Britain 1750-
1835: A Dangerous Recreation, Jaqueline Pearson argues that the ideological rhetoric 
surrounding women’s reading was central to “[t]he period’s most important debates” (1). 
Whether dealing with “authority, gender and sexuality, the economics and morality of 
consumption, national identity and stability, [or] class and revolution,” the reading 
woman permeated the conversation; however, she was never wholly disparaged or 
praised but clouded by ambivalence (Pearson 1). Because of this philosophical division, 
the “reading woman” could be a metonym for progress or corruption, erudition or 
frivolity. These discordant ideals placed the reading woman into a liminal space, at once 
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a signal of progress and symbol of corruption. Men who thought similarly to the 
theologian John Brown believed that the female mind was not naturally fit for a literary 
self-education because women’s timidity of mind could easily lead them astray and result 
in corruption.2 Instead, women should focus on the domestic sphere and remain the 
foundation of morality in the home. Divisively, as Samuel Johnson notes, the eighteenth-
century educated woman was not content to remain private. Instead, “the revolution of 
years…produced a generation of Amazons of the pen, who…asserted their claim” to a 
more equitable education and, as women like Charlotte Lennox and Jane Austen 
illustrate, to use this knowledge to create novels. Contradictory ideas such as these 
formed a paradox for the learned woman; while eighteenth-century gender roles were 
“increasingly prescribed in theory,” particularly by conservative thinkers like John 
Brown or James Fordyce, they were, as Johnson illustrates, “increasingly broken through 
practice” (Colley 250).3 Chapters III and IV—which focus on Lennox and Austen 
respectively—will further explore the complexities of eighteenth-century gender 
expectations, specifically those that impacted woman’s access to both a literary as well as 
an equitable education.  
These warring ideas can perhaps best be described, to make use of Raymond 
Williams’ terms, as the conflict between dominant and emergent ideologies. When 
emergent ideologies threaten the dominant culture, Williams argues that the dominant 
culture frequently responds by enacting more stringent control over new aspects of 
human existence, thus constraining the emergent culture. Women’s reading, for instance, 
might be deemed subversive by the dominant culture because, “[r]ather than erasing I, 
                                                             
2 For the purposes of this thesis, a literary education is defined as knowledge acquired through female 
reading and writing rather than filtered through a mainstream, primarily domestic, female education.  
3 Emphasis my own.  
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reading might reassert it by privileging personal pleasure, and rather than confining 
within a domestic sphere, it might open up a wider community of ideas,” thus threatening 
the status quo (Pearson 17). When eighteenth-century gender roles—specifically those 
concerning reading, writing, and education—are contextualized within these terms, it is 
unsurprising that women’s education, the role that reading should play in said education, 
and the systemic enigma of the female self both explicitly and implicitly permeate 
political debates, conduct books, treatises, and novels of the time; in simpler terms, as 
women pushed back against patriarchal constructs, access to education was further 
confined as a means of control. In chapters III and IV, this thesis will read The Female 
Quixote and Northanger Abbey as artifacts of an emergent female ideology that uses a 
masculine tradition to advocates for women’s learning.   
In studying women’s literary responses to these patriarchal customs, John Locke’s 
theories of the tabula rasa, the conduct of the mind, and education all invite analysis 
because they were both authoritative in eighteenth-century society and also appropriated 
by women writers. Resultingly, Chapter II focuses on Locke’s theories in order to lay the 
groundwork for the later study of both Lennox and Austen. In identifying the human 
mind as a blank page, Locke universalized knowledge and reason. Women like Astell, 
Montagu, Lennox, and Austen harnessed this notion and demanded that their minds, too, 
be treated as capable of reason and growth. Further, Locke’s delineation of how a human 
comes to furnish his or her mind with knowledge, as explored in An Essay Concerning 
Humane Understanding and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, granted additional 
material for women to use when advocating for female learning because Locke named 
education and experience as the two great teachers—both of which were often denied to 
women. Lastly, in his expansive analysis on the learning of children, Some Thoughts 
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Concerning Education, Locke granted women a model by which they could contextualize 
their own educational ideas. Chapter II of this thesis both explores the potential that 
Locke’s ideals held for women and also demonstrates how women, specifically Astell 
and Montague, utilized his principles to appeal for female education. As this thesis 
progresses, Locke’s authoritative ideas, as well as the latent potential they held for 
women, will be woven into discussion of Lennox’s and Austen’s quixotic novels.   
 In 1752 Charlotte Lennox published The Female Quixote, contributing her voice 
to the burgeoning educational conversation and arguing that both a literary education and 
experience are necessary to produce a moral and agent woman; thus, Chapter III of this 
thesis focuses on the educational arguments of Lennox contextualized within Locke’s 
ideas.4 Through Quixote, Lennox advocates for women’s equitable education by 
implementing the quixotic model, as presented in Don Quixote, to demonstrate both the 
intellectual potential of her heroine and the distorting effect that traditional gendered 
education has upon women. Quixotism, which depicts a hero or heroine who strays from 
reason and reality because of their romantic reading, is at its very foundation a genre 
concerned with education. After all, in order to rehabilitate the Quixote, one must educate 
the Quixote. Consequently, as Lennox demonstrates, it is the ideal platform from which 
to explore female education. Though the protagonist Arabella begins the story 
accomplished but quixotic, Lennox utilizes Locke’s theories to demonstrate that this state 
is not innate but constructed by the dominant culture. In rendering a Lockean 
rehabilitation for Arabella, Lennox argues that women, too, are rational creatures capable 
of reason; however, just like men, they require a careful education that combines both 
                                                             
4 According to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, education is learning with the intent “to make our natural 
faculty of reason both the better and the sooner to judge rightly between truth and error, good and evil” 
(677). Because of its pervasiveness, this thesis will employ Johnson’s moralistic and reason-based 
definition of education to analyze women’s learning.   
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reading and experience to become rational beings. Envisioning a tangible solution for 
women, Lennox writes her own “curriculum” that incorporates varied reading material 
and gives even the domestic women some experience with the world: her periodical the 
Lady’s Museum. Thus, Chapter II demonstrates that Lennox both argues for women’s 
balanced Lockean learning within The Female Quixote and presents a solution within her 
periodical, solidifying her contribution to furthering women’s education.  
Completed in 1799, Jane Austen’s earliest novel Northanger Abbey is the logical 
culminating point of this study because, as Barbara Benedict states, “Nowhere in 
Austen… are reading and its social consequences more central than [in] Northanger 
Abbey” and, therefore, it is addressed in Chapter IV here (1). Despite Lennox’s active 
engagement with the educational conversation, it is only Austen who harnesses this 
discourse, the quixotic form, as well as Locke’s ideas, to write an intellectually 
empowered heroine, Catherine. In so doing, Austen creates a hierarchy of feminine 
readers ⏤Mrs. Allen, Isabella Thorpe, Eleanor Tilney, and Catherine Morland⏤that 
elucidates the inherent deficiencies of a feminine reading that is founded in male-centric 
ideology and demonstrates how true education empowers women to create a sense of self 
that is independent of the dominant discourse. However, the antidote to this poor 
unreflective reading is presented in the character of Catherine, who combines judicial 
reading and experience to enact her own rehabilitation. The result of this authentic female 
learning, as well as the subversive manner in which Catherine is continuously 
characterized, is something truly new in women’s fiction. Where Lennox fails to create a 
text that functions outside of masculine constructs, Northanger is a novel that is able to 
“invent the impregnable language that will wreck partitions, classes, and rhetorics” and 
succeeds in creating Hélène Cixous’ “feminine writing” (42-3). A careful study of 
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reading in Northanger Abbey reveals that Austen utilizes her hierarchy of female readers 
to illustrate the transformative ability that proper reading has on the female intellect. 
Analyzing the text through this lens opens up a singular comparison between Lennox and 
Austen; though each chronicles the impact that feminine education has upon a woman’s 
agency, only Austen employs authentic writing to create something new, resulting in an 





Not Born but Made: Women’s Appropriation of Lockean Ideals 
These are the impressions that are made on our senses by outward objects that are 
extrinsical to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from powers 
intrinsical and proper to itself, which, when reflected on by itself, become also 
objects of its contemplation — are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. 
Thus the first capacity of human intellect is — that the mind is fitted to receive 
the impressions made on it; either through the senses by outward objects, or by 
its own operations when it reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes 
towards the discovery of anything, and the groundwork whereon to build all 
those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world.   
      John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane 
                                                                             Understanding, 1690 
For since God has given women as well as men intelligent souls, why should they 
be forbidden to improve them? Since he has not denied us the faculty of thinking, 
why should we not (at least in gratitude to him) employ our thoughts on himself 
their noblest object, and not unworthily bestow them on trifles and gaieties and 
secular affairs…Especially since the will is blind, and cannot choose but by the 
direction of the understanding; or to speak more properly, since the soul always 
wills according as she understands, so that if she understands amiss, she wills 
amiss.  
                                                          Mary Astell, A Serious Proposal to the 
                                                                            Ladies, 1694 
 
In an attempt to characterize the social and cultural features of the long eighteenth 
century comprehensively, literary scholars and historians routinely apply sweeping, albeit 
too-often imperfect, labels—The Age of Reason, The Enlightenment, The Age of 
Sensibility. At the risk of encumbering the age with yet another such term, I propose, for 
the purposes of this thesis, that we consider the long eighteenth century as an “Age of 
Education.” From the time John Locke began publishing in 1689 through the dawn of the 
nineteenth century, there was a significant increase in the number of men and, more 
pertinent to this study, the number of women writing and publishing texts centered on 
education; whereas in the seventeenth century women who openly voiced their discontent 
with the intellectual status quo were rarities— like Mary Astell and Anne Finch—the 
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eighteenth century saw a steady rise in educational treatises both written by and directed 
towards women. This trend culminated at the end of the century with Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s 1792 Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Hannah More’s 1799 
Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education. This is not to say that women first 
began contemplating the inequities of gender-biased education during this time, but, in 
the simplest terms, the rise in literacy, the increase in printed material, and the 
destabilizing of women’s roles did create a unique moment in the history that women 
filled with their own writings on education. Though these intellectual undertakings are 
less common in the first half of the century, woman like Mary Astell (1666-1731) and 
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762) made remarkable and early contributions to 
this burgeoning tradition. The upturn in women’s published advocacy of “equitable” 
education, at least in part, was a response to the shifting philosophical perception of the 
human mind. Enlightenment philosophers like John Locke found traditional ideas of 
intelligence to be inconsistent with empirical logic and, thus, rejected the primacy of 
innate ideas. With his An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (1689), Locke 
depicted the human mind as a tabula rasa, a blank page upon which were inscribed 
perceptions and sensations.5 Therefore, in Locke’s eyes, one is not born but made. For 
women, whose lesser status was ingrained early by societal constructs, this perception of 
intelligence was compelling. As will be explored in the first section of this chapter, which 
centers on the Lockean conception of the mind, Locke’s “new” theory had important 
implications for the evolution in views of female intellectual potential in England. In his 
Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), which dominates the second section of 
this chapter, Locke expanded his influence by applying his empirical ideas of human 
                                                             
5 From this point forward, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding will be referred to as Essay.  
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understanding to the learning of children.6 Though twenty-first-century discussion of 
Locke is often ruled by his essays on government, his inquiries into education 
“supersede[d] his political arguments in their breadth of influence on eighteenth-century 
culture” and paved the way for women to redefine their intellect (Larkin 172).  For over a 
century after his death, Locke’s ideas of the mind and his notions on the education of 
children permeated eighteenth-century society and, more germane to this study, the 
educational endeavors of women. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, Hannah More, and Jane 
Austen, for instance, are all documented readers of Locke. Thus, as Margaret Ezell 
argues, Lockean ideals were in the air during the eighteenth century, and “it would have 
been virtually impossible for a literate person to have been unaware of his theories” 
(141).  
This emphasis on knowledge is not unique to the long eighteenth century. Milton 
noted in 1644 that education is “one of the greatest and noblest Designs that can be 
thought on”; however, during this time, whether in periodicals, treatises, or novels, both 
men and women alike published on education to an unprecedented extent (1). The steady 
rise in women’s publishing on their too-often repressed intellectual potential is not 
attributable to a single event or cause, but the prevalence of Locke’s idea of the mind is 
an intriguing factor. Locke, an “environmentalist,” who like all philosophers of this name 
believed that one’s environment shaped the individual, shifted away from traditional 
“nativist” philosophies that promoted innate ideas. Because Locke’s theories made the 
acquisition of knowledge more universal, women appropriated his work to validate their 
arguments for a more equitable education. As will be analyzed in the final section of this 
chapter, which explores women’s implementation of Lockean ideals, women 
                                                             
6 From this point forward, Some Thoughts Concerning Education will be referred to as STCE.  
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educationalists manipulated and even critiqued Locke’s work; however, in all cases, 
Locke’s cultural authority was a flexible tool for women thinkers to implement. Though 
Locke himself rarely spoke of women’s intelligence in his writings, the inclusivity of his 
language carved an opening for women to apply Locke’s notions of human understanding 
to their own tabula rasa. Through the juxtaposition of Locke’s theories of ideas and 
education with female-authored educational letters and treatises— namely Mary Astell’s 
and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s — it becomes apparent that Locke’s theory of the 
mind was a weapon that women used to point out credibly the socially constructed nature 
of their ignorance, legitimize their intellectual potential, and argue for a more equitable 
education.  
Before analyzing Locke’s Essay and STCE, we must first place Locke himself in 
the context of an ongoing and bifurcated debate about the patriarchal nature of his work. 
Although Locke wrote during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, study of his work 
and its possible applications for women did not become prevalent until after the feminist 
movements, which advocated for such inquiries into traditionally “patriarchal” texts. 
Therefore, the first and second waves of feminism were the catalyst for many studies into 
the history of woman’s subjugation. In the 1940s, Simone De Beauvoir compellingly 
argued that “[h]istory has shown that men have always held all the concrete powers” 
(159) Thirty years later, Kate Millet added that “sex is a category with political 
implications” and that all instances in which “one group of persons is controlled by 
another” is inherently political (23). These landmark texts were cognizant of the 
historical realities of women's oppression but also spoke more to the present state of 
affairs. That is to say, they studied women of the past to evoke change in their own time, 
not to analyze the complexities of women’s roles in preceding centuries. With these 
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studies of sexuality, power, and the patriarchy, feminist thinkers like De Beauvoir and 
Millet paved the way for the exploration of canonical texts, such as Locke’s, from a 
feminist perspective. Exemplifying these resulting studies, Susan Moller Okin’s Women 
in Western Political Thought and C. B. Macpherson’s The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke both seek to analyze philosophical and political ideas 
that subjugated women in the eighteenth century and also to “rediscover some of the 
‘founding mothers’ of” feminist thought (Coole 139).  
Through the process of revisiting patriarchal texts, Locke and his political, 
philosophical, and educational ideas have been both attacked and, more recently, rescued 
by feminist critics. For instance, MacPherson argues that Locke may have propagated the 
liberalistic and universal ideas of justice and equality, but he never extended these to 
women. Feminist critics like MacPherson see this self-contradiction as most apparent in 
his conversation of the marriage contract. Though Locke argued that marriage must be 
among two consenting parties, he “did not give women the status of consenting 
individuals” outside of this marriage contract (Coole 139). Feminist criticism of Locke 
seems to be made up of antithetical pairings, for MacPherson’s argument, like seemingly 
all thoughts on Locke, finds its converse in another feminist critic, Mary Lyndon 
Shanley. After studying seventeenth-century marriage contracts, Shanley contends that 
Locke, in fact, revolutionized marriage with his “astonishing notion[s]” that granted 
women more freedom. As will be demonstrated in later chapters, women’s roles in 
marriage are frequently represented in female-authored novels and, therefore, present an 
added level of connectivity between Locke’s interest and those of female authors. The 
contradictory view of MacPherson with that of Shanley is merely one example of the 
contentious nature of Lockean studies; however, it is representative of an ongoing trend 
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in the scholarly conversation. Is Locke an iconoclastic defender of female rights? 
Alternatively, does he hypocritically perpetuate the male hegemony? The answer is 
simple: Many scholars have fallen prey to presentism, posing the wrong question. 
Unequivocally, John Locke promoted some patriarchal notions with his work; however, 
scholars who attack Locke for this have mistakenly taken him out of his historical 
moment and transplanted him within modern ideas of gender constructionism. More 
moderate critics like Mary B. Walsh maintain that though Locke does perpetuate some 
“disturbingly patriarchal” ideas, the “latent potential in Locke’s philosophy for 
addressing women’s particular circumstances” is too often ignored by other feminist 
critics (Walsh 251). This question—what “latent potential” did Locke’s work grant 
women? —is one that guides this study. Despite the contentious debates that surround 
feminists’ studies of Locke, when consideration is given to the universal nature of his 
theories and the number of eighteenth-century women who were in conversation with his 
ideas, it is clear that Locke’s work held power for women and that this potential 
necessitates exploration.  
Furnishing the “Vast Store”: Lockean Theory of the Mind  
 To grasp better the omnipresence of Lockean ideas during the eighteenth 
century—and their subsequent impact on women educationalists— requires an awareness 
of seventeenth-century philosophy prior to Locke. Locke himself “was quick to point out 
that he had not invented a new way of knowing but had only extended a mode of analysis 
which had [from Aristotle to Descartes] a respectable tradition” (Yolton 341).  In the 
early seventeenth century, humanity was most commonly viewed in two conflicting 
traditions: (1) in the Augustinian view, where one’s character is grounded in original sin 
and, as Thomas Hobbes argues, in self-interest, or (2) as innately pure, shaped in the 
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image of God and then corrupted through experience (Ezell 140). Both nativist concepts 
emphasize the innate qualities of humanity. In consideration of these theories, the most 
significant distinctions between Locke and his immediate English predecessors, the 
Cambridge Platonists, are their support of innate principles.  Henry More (1614-1687) 
argues, in his Appeal to the Natural Faculties of the Minde of Man, that the belief that 
“the Soul has no Knowledge nor Notion, but what is in a Passive way impressed, or 
delineated upon her” is incongruent with our knowledge of God (qtd. in Rogers 84). 
Instead, he maintains that “actuall Knowledge in a man” stems from “outward objects” 
that are merely “reminders” of our native knowledge (84). Two significant points must be 
noted here. First, consistent with other Cambridge Platonists, More firmly believes that 
humanity is born with ingrained knowledge and that experiences, or in Locke’s terms 
“sensations” and “perceptions,” are mere reminders of these inborn “truths.” Second, 
More is arguing against a pre-established tradition that supposes the mind a blank slate 
or, as he calls it, an “Abrasa Tabula, a table book in which nothing is writ” (84). From 
More’s comments, it is clear that Locke did not create the blank page or moldable clay 
metaphor but merely popularized it. After all, Aristotle spoke of his “unscribed tablet,” 
and Plato spoke of the mind as a preexisting entity long before English philosophers 
picked up their pens; therefore, it is important to remember that what makes Locke’s 
theories singular is not their originality but both the cultural authority that they gained 
during the eighteenth century and the fact that he situates his theories within empirical 
epistemology. Further, and paramount to this study, the divergences between Cambridge 
Platonists’ theories and Locke’s allowed women the vehicle to shed the damaging “fact” 
of their innate inferiority.  
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Though pre-established debates inform Locke’s most prominent ideas, there are 
significant differences in his methodology and the terms he employs, and these variances 
set Locke apart from past philosophers and make him more serviceable for female 
thinkers. When studying the inborn nature of humanity, seventeenth-century philosophers 
spoke most commonly of the soul— a term that Locke later abandons in favor of the 
mind. The Cambridge Platonists “hardly use the term mind at all,” because seventeenth-
century thinkers, who were often theologians as well, emphasized the spirituality of the 
mind, making the concept of the soul more suitable (Rogers 82). However, this 
spiritualizing of philosophical inquiry is inherently flawed. By necessity, speculation 
permeates any exploration into spirituality, and, therefore, speculation drives the 
philosophical notions of Platonists like More and Ralph Cudworth, who both grounded 
their arguments in Christianity. That is not to say that the primary distinction between 
Locke and the Cambridge Platonists was religion—Locke himself was a devout man—
but to note the essential difference in their manner of inquiry, which holds important 
implications for women. More and Cudworth alike entered into their work with a 
predisposed outcome; God made man in his image, and God’s image is not a blank page. 
However, as any disciple of Bacon’s “New Method” knows, one cannot suppose anything 
as factual that is not proven through empirical evidence. Empiricism, then, is how Locke 
sets himself apart and facilitates women’s discovery of agency  
As G.A.J. Rogers illustrates, “To read Locke after More and Cudworth is to move 
from one world to another” because “theological questions” do not dominate Locke’s 
treatises (87). This is apparent even from the preface of Cudworth’s The True Intellectual 
Systems of the Universe, where he undertakes a lengthy attack, or in his terms “apology,” 
on “Atheistick Doctrines,” setting up his own treatise as a refutation of 
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environmentalists’ thought (1). Thus, it is incontrovertible that theological concerns drive 
his text. In stark contrast, Locke’s “Epistle to the Reader” does not mention theology at 
all; instead, it introduces what will be an empirical inquiry into the “step[s] the mind 
takes in its progress towards Knowledge” (Essay 1). The juxtaposition of Cudworth and 
More against Locke demonstrates an evolution in discourse; rather than utilizing 
philosophy to rationalize theology, Locke used a more pragmatic method of inquiry, 
which relied on evidence. This is significant for women because when theology is no 
longer paramount in philosophical and political thought, it diminishes the validity of the 
Bible as justification for women’s oppression. Adam’s “innate” dominance over Eve and 
Paul’s misogynistically read sermons hold less significance within Locke’s theories; 
therefore, not only Locke’s ideas but his very method hold potential for women.  
It is immediately apparent that Locke’s pragmatic inquiry into human 
understanding differed drastically from the religious treatises of the Cambridge 
Platonists; however, a more in-depth study of Locke’s ideas is needed to comprehend 
why his philosophies appealed to female educationalists during the eighteenth century. 
The answer is in part found in the universality of Locke’s theories and the autonomy that 
they promoted. This underlying potential for women is illustrated in the landmark Essay, 
which refuted the popular Cambridge Platonists by arguing against innate traits of any 
sort. Instead, Locke delineates the human mind as a blank slate that requires filling before 
it takes on any character of its own. In Book II of his Essay, “Of Ideas,” Locke begins by 
saying,  
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, 
without any ideas: —How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast 
store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost 
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endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this 
I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; 
and from that it ultimately derives itself. (Essay 2.1.2).  
According to Locke, the “blank page” gains knowledge through experiences compiled 
from sensations and perceptions (i.e., the “self” forms from one’s environment). Thus, all 
knowledge stems from an individual’s circumstances, education, and everyday existence. 
As Locke meticulously illustrates, this is true of both abstract ideas like right and wrong 
or more concrete understandings like mathematics.  
Locke’s hypothesis may not seem radical to our modern eyes, but eighteenth-
century women were taught of their inferiority from birth, both physically and mentally. 
Thus, the notion of the human mind as a blank page waiting for knowledge was an 
alluring one. In her article on the roots of liberal feminism, Melisa Butler notes that when 
viewed through the lens of Locke, “[w]omen had intellectual potential which could be 
developed to a higher level”; however, this view is not unanimously held (116). Some 
scholars like Nancy Hirschmann argue that feminist theorists are too generous with 
Locke and that his “apparent gender neutrality…camouflages conventionally gendered 
assumptions”; however, what Locke himself believed is not of the utmost importance 
(168). What is vital is that Locke’s ideas could be (and were) appropriated by women and 
implemented to justify their intellectual existence. Intentionally or not, Locke illuminated 
the socially constructed nature of knowledge and—as will be illustrated by Mary Astell, 
Lady Mary Wortly Montagu, Charlotte Lennox, and Jane Austen— left an opening for 
women to signify the artificiality of gendered education.  
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But the question that Locke’s tabula rasa raises—one that dominated conduct 
books, sermons and philosophical inquiry—is what happens if individuals misperceive 
and fill their minds with false ideas rather than “truth?” And further, what are false ideas 
composed of? Locke’s notion of misperception builds upon his theory of how the mind is 
“furnished” with knowledge and, consequently, holds similar potential for women’s 
traditionally isolated situation. As Neal Wood argues, according to Locke, “we create or 
re-create ourselves by altering our social environment” because it is our environment that 
comprises our perceptions and sensations which, in turn, furnish our mind (647). The idea 
that one’s environment is the leading factor in development, or social environmentalism, 
drove Enlightenment thinking and also raised difficult philosophical question about false 
knowledge. In the section titled “Of True and False Ideas,” Locke states that  
[a]ny idea, then, which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the 
existence of things, or to any idea in the minds of other men, cannot properly for 
this alone be called false. For these representations, if they have nothing in them 
but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought false, being exact 
representations of something.  (Essay 2.32.20) 
In simpler terms, our ideas are not false because they can only be created by the 
perceptions and sensations with which we have experience; however, our judgement of 
these experiences might be. Therefore, for Locke, false knowledge stems from incorrect 
judgement of sensations and perceptions as well as from the unquestioned acceptance of 
“knowledge” imparted from others. To explain this misperception or faulty judgement, 
Locke claims that the mind “judges” what it knows “to be a perfect complete idea of a 
sort of thing which really it is not” (Essay 2.32.23). Here, Locke employs the example of 
gold. A person may join “the ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and 
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fusible,” together and determine “that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold” 
(Essay 2.32.23). Gold, of course, is much more intricate than this simple understanding 
and, thus, if a person perceives this definition as complete, he or she has implemented 
flawed judgement. According to Locke’s Essay, all knowledge stems from outside 
sources and, in order to prevent misperception, a complete image of something is 
required. Consequently, this theory has potential for women educational writers because, 
in essence, Locke demonstrates that education is necessary to fight against 
misperceptions and banish false ideas.  
However, fundamental to this theory of ideas, and of utmost concern to 
Enlightenment philosophers, is the distorting effect that customs, opinions, fashions, etc. 
can have upon the psyche. In his Essay, Locke spends great attention exploring how 
perceptions and sensations can lead to flawed ideas of reality. Locke challenges his 
readers to question knowledge, to use empirical evidence, and to rely on their own senses 
rather than the tenets told to them by others. To enumerate, Locke claims that “custom, a 
greater power than nature,” holds great influence over the mind because humans are often 
taught to “bow their minds and submit their understandings to” the so-called “natural” 
principles of law without question (Essay 1.2.25). In his political writing, Locke 
illustrates how these supposed natural principles allow fathers to rule children and kings 
to rule subjects with little challenge. As Locke says, “It is no wonder that grown men, 
either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life, or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should 
not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets; especially when one of their 
principles is, that principles ought not to be questioned” (Essay 1.2.25). Compellingly, 
these ideas are imperative to the flawed learning present within the growing number of 
female-quixotic novels during the eighteenth century. As will be explored throughout this 
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study, female educational writings illustrated—as Locke’s theory of the mind predicted— 
that the wholesale adoption of patriarchal customs weakened women, making them 
susceptible to false ideas and subjugation.  
It is apparent that Locke’s skeptical nature brings into question the possibility of 
absolute knowledge; however, setting this aside, Locke still argued that a moral education 
could correct improper judgement and blind acceptance, an idea that was used by women 
to validate their own arguments for education. From Locke’s Essay, says Wood, one 
should understand that “[w]e must become rational, self-directed individuals, instead of 
puppets forever manipulated by the strings of fashion, authority, and orthodoxy”; as 
previously demonstrated, becoming this rational creature is no simple task (663). 
However, Locke’s notion of the mind, as presented above, holds two important 
implications for women. First, education is the most vital means to alleviate and to 
protect oneself against false judgement and to encourage rationality; Locke explores this 
in more detail in his Some Thoughts Concerning Education, which will later be analyzed 
in this paper. And second, accepting knowledge from a source that is steeped in tradition 
rather than empirical logic is the surest way to ensnare ourselves in “the yolk of false 
opinion and insidious custom” (Wood 663). Therefore, according to Locke’s ideas on 
false knowledge and customs, women are in a difficult dilemma. As women 
educationalists like Astell and Montagu demonstrate through their educational arguments, 
women are sheltered from gaining their own experiences by social custom and “truth” is 
handed to them by patriarchal sources; therefore, almost every element of their existence, 
according to Locke’s own reasoning, sets them up for irrationality and immorality.  
Every layer of Locke’s argument seems to form new ammunition for women to 
use while advocating for more equitable female learning; Locke’s notion of volition 
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further demonstrates this latent potential. At the conclusion of his exploration into true 
and false ideas, Locke importantly states, “So that liberty cannot be where there is no 
thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be 
volition, where there is no liberty” (Essay, 2.21.8). Here, the individual has used 
perception and sensation to reach an opinion and to will a specific action, yet he or she is 
prevented from following through because of a lack of free will. In his conception of 
liberty, Locke employs his theory of knowledge and false perception to reinforce his 
political arguments against tyranny and vie for individualism; so, too, did women. When 
viewing Locke’s ideas of knowledge and power in this light, it is clear that they are 
highly interconnected and hold “dangerous” potential for women. Lockean logic bolsters 
the argument that, as illustrated by Mary Astell in A Serious Proposal for the Ladies, a 
woman who understands incorrectly will act according to these understandings; therefore, 
education must be acquired by women as well as men if “proper” conduct is desired. 
And, more iconoclastically yet still supported by Locke’s ideas, if, as Mary 
Wollstonecraft argues, we “[s]trengthen the female mind by enlarging it, [then] there will 
be an end to blind obedience” (93). Thus, the underlying potential of the Lockean theory 
of the mind to promote autonomy and self-reliance for women is clear.  
 Before we progress to Locke’s theories of education and their importance to 
women, we must consider a final important subject, power and its relation to gender. 
During the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries, liberals, like Locke, 
“mounted a critique of blind traditionalism,” arguing instead for the education of 
reasonable individuals who use empirical evidence to make logical decisions (Porter 
256). Rather than relegating the masses to ignorance, Enlightenment philosophers 
believed that each individual “had the right to moral autonomy and self-realization” 
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(256). However, the issue with this model, as least to those hegemonic and patriarchal 
forces, is that an educated populace is less malleable than an ignorant one. In 
consideration of this tension, Locke’s theory of the mind and reason is on an essential 
level political and, resultantly, raises the question of power. Locke, as Alex Tuckness 
demonstrates, radically argued “in response to those who thought that Adam, by virtue of 
fatherhood, was monarch to the world...that paternal power exists for a different purpose 
than political power” (627). Therefore, it makes sense that Locke dedicates a large 
chapter to the delineation of power. To define power, Locke simply says that the mind 
“considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in 
another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call 
power” (Essay 2.21.1). Importantly, Locke emphasizes the mental rather than the 
physical aspect of authority, the power to change one’s mind or to have one’s mind 
changed. Again, this idea has political consequences for men and women alike because 
sovereigns, whether of the state or the home, hold authority not only over the body but 
also over the mind. Though Locke considers all humans free, some are bound by 
necessity―the necessity to act, speak, or believe as someone with power over them 
mandates in order to escape negative consequences―and this limits their freedom. In 
explaining the power of free will, Locke argues,  
So far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, 
according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man FREE.  
Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man’s power; 
wherever doing or not doing will not equally FOLLOW upon the preference of 
his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be 
voluntary. (Essay 2.21.8)   
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According to Locke, individuals who acts against their own desires to preserve their 
safety within the status quo are not free even though they act voluntarily. To delineate 
this pull to act against an individual’s autonomous desires, Locke utilizes the idea of 
necessity. This term is important both to Locke’s theory of government and to women’s 
conception of agency. Locke argues that our actions are driven by contemplating and 
judging the dichotomy of happiness and despair; simply, we utilize our knowledge and 
our judgement to determine which course of actions would best lead to contentment 
rather than towards the path of distress. However, what happens to the woman whose 
education, relationship to knowledge, and even access to many experiences are restricted 
by the dominant culture? In the eighteenth century, woman’s experience was so vastly 
constrained by custom that a proper education and, consequently, proper reasoning were 
denied to her.  
This facet of Locke’s power dynamics is valuable in the analysis and 
comprehension of women’s writing in the eighteenth century. As Locke argues, “What is 
it that determines the will? the true and proper answer is, The mind” (Essay 2.21.29). 
And if the mind, which contains nothing but what an individual has experienced through 
perception and sensation, is inadequately groomed―as most women’s surely were― 
then, as Mary Astell pointed out in her proposal, those who have a faulty understanding 
also have a flawed will. Locke’s theory of the mind promotes the idea that all individuals 
require an adequate, if not equal, education in order to judge their own actions correctly 
and behave morally; viewed in this light education is a societal duty. However, the 
second power dilemma that Locke negotiates is even more unsettling because education 
cannot eradicate it. A thoughtful individual might judge his actions moral based upon 
sound reasoning and empirical evidence but still foresee negative consequences, not 
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because his intentions are improper but because they run counter to societal or patriarchal 
custom. In order to maintain a semblance of happiness, this individual may act counter to 
his or her will, and thus, is not free. This struggle between the autonomy of will and the 
hegemonic force of necessity illustrates the quandary that women, especially writing 
women, were placed in daily. As Roy Porter noted, the majority of what we know about 
women and what they “thought―or were expected to think―comes from men, from 
sermons and courtesy manuals, from male diarists, writers, painters and doctors” (22).  
Despite the strides scholarship has made in rediscovering female voices, to a great extent 
this will always be true. And this unpleasant reality has everything to do with power. 
Even uncommonly educated and worldly women, like Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, 
advised their daughters to “conceal whatever learning [they attained], with as much 
solicitude as [they] would hide crookedness or lameness” (qtd. in Porter 23). The power 
that dominant discourse held over women was and is great; it stifled education, snuffed 
out writing, and confined intelligent women to menial positions. Therefore, Locke’s ideas 
of the mind, will, and power had great influence in and of themselves because his 
theories challenged the status quo and gained tremendous cultural authority during the 
eighteenth century. In the hands of female educationalists, this authority became a 
weapon used to question their position in society, challenge their right to education, and 
make their voices heard through the written word. What made Locke so useful for 
women writers is that English society, not unanimously but at large, “warmly applauded” 
Locke’s theories as the “formation of solid, respectable citizens” (Ezell 142). Therefore, 
through proxy, the ideas of female educationalists gained traction and were more readily 
disseminated. As Turner demonstrates in her study of women Living by the Pen, “As 
[Locke’s] ideas gained credence in” the eighteenth century, “they provided a 
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philosophical basis for an expansion in educational opportunities,” and, as women like 
Astell, Montagu, Lennox, Wollstonecraft, and Austen demonstrate, opportunities to 
publish upon education as well (43).  
The Age of Education: Locke’s Methodology and Its Implications for Women 
John Locke’s contributions to politics and philosophy—namely his Two Treatises 
of Government (1690) and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1789) —are 
often treated as more significant than his thoughts on proper education. However, 
Lockean critics like Margaret Ezell and Gillian Brown contend that Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education (1793) had a greater impact on eighteenth-century society than 
any of Locke’s aforementioned works (Larkin 171). Even Constance I. Smith, whose 
article establishes that Locke’s ideas were not wholly original, cannot deny that he was 
the “father of modern education in England” (403). In seeming contradiction, most 
researchers of eighteenth-century education focus on the latter half of the century because 
after 1760 there was a dramatic increase in men and women publishing on education 
(Ezell 139-41). However, as Ezell demonstrates, this subsequent “movement was 
spearheaded largely by the writings of one man, John Locke” (141). Thus, Locke’s 
importance to any study of eighteenth-century education is evident; however, more 
pertinent to this inquiry is how women writers availed themselves of Locke’s theories. As 
is logical and discernable through a study of STCE, Locke constructed his schema for 
education based upon his premise of ideas; therefore, his notions of the tabula rasa, 
misperception, power, and judgment all play a vital role in his model for instructing 
children to become moral and productive citizens. For that reason, all of the underlying 
potential for women contained in Locke’s theory of the mind and ideas is also manifest in 
his notion of education. Locke’s STCE—which was initially a series of instructive 
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correspondences between himself and his friends Edward and Mary Clarke— delineates 
how a proper upbringing can alleviate the risk of immorality and a variety of other 
adverse traits; in essence, Locke wrote a detailed guide to raising socially conscious and 
responsible citizens. This molding of morality is of particular significance to women 
because they were often viewed as more susceptible to corruption than men. It was a 
persistent fear voiced in conduct books and sermons that “romance and distraction, the 
extravagance of vanity, and the rage of conquest” motivated women rather than the 
pursuit of virtue (Fordyce 14). Thus, Locke’s STCE spoke to women just as readily as to 
men. As Alex Tuckness argues, education, for Locke, “consists in helping people to 
overcome the temptations of shortsighted behavior,” a danger that women were just as 
prone to as men (629). As women like Astell, Montagu, Lennox, and Austen 
demonstrate, Locke’s morality-driven theory of learning coupled with his tabula rasa 
created a new definition of education that women educationalists—and novelists, as will 
be argued in subsequent chapters—could exploit to substantiate their ideas regarding 
female potential.  
Education, as expressed in STCE, is a strategic molding of a child’s mind into 
something rational and socially responsible, capable of transforming perceptions into 
proper judgement; therefore, at its most fundamental level, STCE is an intentional 
application of Locke’s theories of the mind onto the most moldable of all clay, children. 
This interconnectivity between Locke’s Essay and STCE is observable from the onset of 
STCE. Introducing his premise that education is the means by which mankind improves 
itself and society, Locke states,   
I think I may say, that of all the Men we meet with, Nine parts of Ten are what 
they are, Good or Evil, useful or not, by their Education. 'Tis that which makes 
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the great difference in Mankind: The little, and almost insensible Impressions on 
our tender Infancies, have very important and lasting Consequences: And there 
'tis, as in the Fountains of some Rivers, where a gentle application of the hand 
turns the flexible Waters into Channels, that make them take quite contrary 
Courses, and by this little direction given them at first in the Source, they receive 
different Tendencies, and arrive at last, at very remote and distant places. (STCE 
2) 
It is evident from Locke’s Essay that he views education as the most effective method of 
creating a rational man; however, from this passage in STCE it is clear that Locke’s 
methodology for educating children is a direct consequence of his own theories of the 
mind. If a man is evil or good it is not a result of his birth, as nativists might argue. 
Instead, he was made that way by his social environment. Importantly, this process of 
forming one’s self begins at infancy and, as such, Locke contends that children must be 
thoughtfully educated from birth. By applying their “hand” in their child’s education, 
parents can shift the “flexible Waters” and make their children moral and rational beings. 
Locke does not set down a curriculum for children to read and memorize; rather, he 
delineates rules that will encourage morality and rationality. When viewed in this fashion, 
parents do not only create and educate of their own children, but they also safeguard the 
integrity of society. As Locke argues, “The well educating of their children is so much 
the duty and concern of parents, and the welfare and prosperity of the nation so much 
depends on it” that it cannot be neglected (STCE 8). Roy Porter notes that during the 
eighteenth century “[u]pbringings were oriented to groom the young for society (and 
Enlightenment educationalists believed that, because the mind was originally like a lump 
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of wax, it was malleable enough to be molded to society’s requirements)” (303). Thus, by 
raising children in a Lockean manner, parents were enacting a civic responsibility.  
 Taking Locke’s previously outlined concept of the mind as the basis for his STCE, 
the sensations and perceptions individuals receive in their youth are the basis of their 
character; if this is true, then, as Locke argues at great length, raising moral and rational 
children requires constant and thoughtful attention (STCE 25). As will be elaborated upon 
in subsequent chapters, the requisite attention was not given to girls’ education, and the 
negative outcomes of this oversight, which are predicted by Locke’s theories, are 
illustrated by female novelist like Lennox and Austen. Considering the delicate 
malleability of the mind, Locke dictates that a child must have near constant supervision 
and that all circumstances and events are teaching moments. Whether applied to boys, 
girls, or fictional quixotic women, this intentionality in education is necessary to avoid 
false ideas and the immorality these ideas promote. For instance, when parents humors 
their children and grants them their desired treat they are, in fact, corrupting “the 
principles of nature in their children, and [then they] wonder afterwards to taste the bitter 
waters when they themselves have poisoned the fountain” (STCE 26). As Locke 
mandates, every moment should be viewed for its possible impacts on a child’s mind. If 
not, something common like spoiling a child might manifest itself in the adult as 
willfulness and pride (27). Female educational writers, whether of treatises or novels, 
also demonstrate how indulgence of girls’ fancies—which they argue is promoted by a 
traditional “pageantry” education— results in flawed women. This simple concept of 
action and reaction drives Locke’s moral education theory. Remember, Locke believed 
that human beings “naturally act in pursuit of their own pleasure” and that education is a 
tool to curb this natural disposition (Tuckness 105). Consequently, Locke’s moral 
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education hinged on the parents’ ability to instill intrinsic motivation into the child so that 
whether observed or not, the child would place aside his or her desires for the pursuit of 
virtue. As Mary Clarke noted in her responses to Locke, this is not a simple mandate; 
however, Locke argues that the repeated lessons that the mother, maid, or tutor imparts to 
the child have a great impact on his or her later ability to restrain desires for pleasure. 
Locke gives an exemplar:  
These Mischiefs are easily enough prevented whilst he is little, being then seldom  
out of sight: And if, during his Childhood, he be constantly and rigorously kept 
from Sitting on the Ground, or drinking any cold Liquor, whilst he is hot, the 
Custom of forbearing grown into Habit, will help much to preserve him, when he 
is no longer under his Maid's or Tutor's Eye. (STCE 14-5) 
Therefore, Locke argues that consistency in youth provides a solid foundation that the 
child will later utilize when his or her elders are no longer watching over them. In 
essence, consistent forbearance creates positive habits and promotes future morality, an 
idea that will later be exemplified by Lennox and Austen. 
When this need for constant supervision and instruction is paired with the 
importance of early childhood perceptions, it is apparent that Locke’s model of education 
is incompatible with a public or boarding school education because these institutions lack 
the supervision and differentiation needed to form all of a child’s experiences into moral 
lessons; therefore, Locke gives very definite recommendations for a child’s primary 
school days that will facilitate the child’s future integrity. As Locke admits, the question 
of whether a child should be schooled at home or abroad is a complicated one because 
each side holds “inconveniences” (STCE 46). This question of public versus private is 
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dominant in the discourse of educationalists—it features prominently in both Lennox’s 
and Austen’s quixotic novels—and thus necessitates exploration.  
Locke promotes a moralistic education for the betterment of society; however, he 
also fears the influence of an imperfect society on youthful minds—after all, he firmly 
argues against unquestioned adoptions of social customs. Resultingly, Locke’s 
instructions for how a child was to obtain this model education reflect his distrust of 
society. When addressing his promotion of home education, Locke mimics the 
contentious questions mothers and fathers might pose to him:   
What shall I do with my Son? If I keep him always at home, he will be in danger 
to be my young Master; and if I send him abroad, how is it possible to keep him 
from the contagion of Rudeness and Vice, which is so every where in fashion? In 
my house, he will perhaps be more innocent, but more ignorant too of the World, 
and being used constantly to the same Faces, and little Company, will, when he 
comes abroad, be a sheepish or conceited Creature. (STCE 45-6) 
Locke gives voice to these pitfalls of home education because he knows them to be 
legitimate concerns. And, importantly, this hypothetical “sheepish or conceited Creature” 
is wielded against the patriarchy by women educationalists from Astell to Wollstonecraft 
and is notably reimagined in both The Female Quixote and Northanger Abbey. Despite 
the validity of these claims, Locke mistrusts the hands of society and, therefore, staunchly 
promotes home education of children where parents can exert more control. In Locke’s 
rebuttal to his own speculative questions he says, “I confess, both sides have their 
Inconveniences, but whilst [the child] is at home, use him as much to your company, and 
the company of…Genteel and well-bred People…[and] keep him from the Taint 
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of...meaner People” (STCE 45-6). Again, Locke is demonstrating his social 
environmentalism; if parents control a child’s acquaintances, they can prevent vice from 
entering the home. In addition, Locke leaves to parental discretion the prospect of going 
abroad to gain greater experience, but above all he mandates that “breeding at home in 
their [parents’] own sight, under a good Governour, is much the best (STCE 45-6). This 
model of education was eagerly taken up by female educationalists because if women are 
left in the home and are denied a proper education, then, as Locke explicitly 
demonstrates, they are likely to be prone to vice, selfishness, and the pursuit of their own 
pleasures. Locke illustrates that humans are what their environment and education make 
them; throughout the long eighteenth century, women educationalists sent out a 
resounding affirmation of this universal notion of the self.   
Because Locke’s essay on education is expansive, it invites much further 
discussion of its contents; however, only one final aspect of STCE is needed to discern 
the possibilities that it holds for women, his own explicit commentary on women 
themselves. His mandates for proper education can generally be divided into two 
categories: the physical and the mental. For physical activity and care of the body, Locke 
says,  
I have said he here, because the principal aim of my Discourse is, how a young 
Gentleman should be brought up from his Infancy, which, in all things, will not so 
perfectly suit the Education of Daughters, though where the difference of Sex 
requires different treatment, 'twill be no hard matter to distinguish. (STCE 12) 
Locke goes on to say that “although greater Regard [is] to be had to Beauty in the 
Daughters,” they should still be given liberty to engage in physical activity because “the 
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nearer they come to the Hardships of their Brothers in their Education, the greater 
Advantage will they receive from it all the remaining Part of their Lives” (14). Thus 
muddying the waters of traditional gendered education, Locke argues that differentiating 
between female and male education is not a simple task. It is indisputable that Locke’s 
essay is aimed at the education of men; however, his thoughts for the education of 
women are much more ambiguous—largely because of his notions of the mind— and, 
consequently, are debated among Locke scholars. Using his few comments on 
differentiated education, Butler, for instance, resolutely argues that, “[t]aken as a whole, 
Locke’s thoughts on education clearly suggest a belief that men and women could be 
schooled in the use of reason” (116). However, as Hirschmann notes, Locke’s assertions 
are few and far between and, therefore, Butler “is too generous to Locke in concluding 
that he grants girls full equality in reasoning ability” (168).  
As STCE progresses, Locke continues to make few references to the education of 
girls, but the telling comments he does make invite female educationalists’ application of 
Locke to their own writing. Though at times critics disagree on the feminist potential in 
Locke’s educational theories, clear threads of equality are woven through the fabric of his 
commentary on women. His comments on female ingenuity, which are exemplary of 
these more universal views, reveal the applicability of Locke for advocates of women’s 
education. When describing how to educate a child authentically or organically, for 
example, he gives an anecdote of watching girls at play. He says,  
I have seen little Girls exercise whole Hours together, and take abundance of 
pains to be expert at Dibstones, as they call it: Whilst I have been looking on, I 
have thought, it wanted only some good Contrivance, to make them employ all 
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that Industry about something that might be more useful to them; and methinks 
'tis only the fault and negligence of elder People, that it is not so. (STCE 115) 
In the play of young girls, Locke sees ingenuity, industry, and creativity. His general 
premise of education works to harness the natural tendencies of children and to employ 
them for their own betterment. When furthering this point, he uses the play of girls, not 
boys. This simple choice illuminates Locke’s views towards women. Yes, women may 
have natural weaknesses; however, says Butler, “he had a classic liberal faith in the 
ability of individual women to overcome these natural obstacles” (118). According to 
STCE, the reason more women do not show this level of ingenuity in their later lives has 
much to do with societal constructs. Because society does not work to develop girls’ 
innate potential, “elder people” create weakened women. Locke further illustrate his 
belief in female potential when he discusses the teaching of foreign languages to children. 
When boys are taught languages, parents tend to employ tutors to teach them 
grammatical rules and structure. However, Locke argues for a different, more feminine 
method. He states that he has often seen a “French-Woman teach a young Girl to speak 
and read French perfectly in a Year or Two, without any Rule of Grammar, or any thing 
else but prattling to her” (STCE 117).  The parents’ insistence on formal tutoring in the 
language for boys often has less-fruitful results. Therefore, Locke “cannot but wonder, 
how Gentlemen have over-seen this way for their Sons, and thought them [their sons] 
more dull or incapable than their Daughters” (117). In light of these thoughts, it is clear 
that Locke believed women to hold, if not equal to men, then at least vast intellectual 
potential. Thus, if society carefully educated the minds of girls, one could reasonably 
conclude that female citizens would be bettered by adherence to Locke’s strictures. And, 




Astell and Montagu: Expelling “the Cloud of Ignorance”  
 Having presented the fundamental aspects of Locke’s theories of the mind and 
education, all that remains is to demonstrate how female educationalists availed 
themselves of Locke to buttress their claims of intellectual potential. As this paper 
progresses, it will apply Locke’s theories to the writings of Astell, Montagu, Lennox, 
Wollstonecraft, and Austen; however, chronology does not necessarily mean causality. I 
do not—in all cases—seek to establish a direct line of influence between these authors 
but rather to illustrate with exemplars a tradition of female educationalists employing 
Locke’s ideas and cultural authority. Therefore, as the earliest of these authors, Astell’s 
ideas will be the first explored. 
 Though Astell’s religious beliefs triggered a complex relationship with Locke, 
her writing on women’s education reveals a grudging use of his premises. Because she 
was both a religious woman and a notable early feminist, Astell walked a fine line. “As 
an advocate of equality between the sexes in marriage and education, she made it her 
principle to ‘call no man Master upon earth’” (Apetrei 509). In an effort to grant women 
this agency she desired for herself, Astell decisively promoted the bettered education of 
women, most notably in her A Serious Proposal for the Ladies (1694). However, 
according to religious teachings, man was charged as master over woman from his very 
conception. Consequently, Astell’s iconoclastic views regarding women often clashed 
with her more conservative beliefs in respect to religion. Interestingly, and perhaps 
ironically as well, Astell openly critiqued Locke’s Essay because his empirical ideas 
could be viewed, and were done so by many, as dangerously critical of religion. 
Undoubtedly adding fuel to Astell’s criticism of Locke was the feud that Astell and John 
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Norris, her friend and Cambridge Platonist, engaged with Locke and his close friend and 
female philosopher, Damaris Masham. 7 However, even though she “objected in print to 
Locke’s deistic views,” Astell also “adopted one of the major arguments” that allowed 
scientists and Enlightenment philosophers like Locke to question social constructs while 
maintaining their belief in God, this being the reasoning that the language of scripture is 
molded to fit social custom and to better convey contrived theological messages (Kelly 
26). Astell used these grounds to dismiss references to women’s subjugation. Thus, it is 
clear that in her writing Astell often struggled to balance opposing views. She both 
combatted the views of the church on women and heralded pursuit of God as of utmost 
importance, condemned Locke’s empirical inquiry into the mind, and yet, grudgingly, 
employed his very methods and ideas. Astell—like Montagu, Lennox, and Austen to 
come—wielded the language of the patriarchy, namely John Locke, to condemn women’s 
subjugation and advocate for more equitable learning, a trend that will continue through 
the eighteenth century and beyond.   
Although Astell’s wary and somewhat contradictory relationship with Locke is 
plain, her educational writings demonstrate that she was, even if hesitantly, in 
conversation with Lockean ideals. Her Proposal was not only a plea for a more beneficial 
education for women but also an actual entreaty for a specific place of learning for 
women; in fact, Astell dedicated this proposal “for a woman’s college to the future Queen 
Anne...who indeed intended to subsidize it, until the bishop of Salisbury dissuaded her” 
(Kelly 25). In her Proposal, Astell argues that in order to “expel the cloud of ignorance 
which custom has involved us in,” women require an education “to furnish our minds 
with a stock of solid and useful knowledge” (29). Here, Astell’s idea resembles Locke’s 
                                                             
7 See Taylor, Kelly, and Springborg.  
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notion of a moral education. This similarity becomes even more apparent as Astell 
continues in her entreaty,  
[P]ermit us only to understand our own duty, and not be forc’d to take it upon 
trust from others; to be at least so far learned, as to be able to form in our minds a 
true Idea of Christianity, it being so very necessary to fence us against the danger 
of these last and perilous days…And let us also acquire a true Practical 
Knowledge such as will convince us of the absolute necessity of Holy Living as 
well as of Right Believing. (30) 
In the same vein as Locke, Astell argues that education does not manifest itself in the 
learning of a specific curriculum but in the acquisition of a foundational understanding of 
the world. Importantly, and reminiscent of Locke, this discernment of “truth” is not the 
unquestioned absorption of social custom; rather, Astell argues that a woman requires 
knowledge to formulate her own understandings and to pursue Christianity with a fuller 
grasp of what that pursuit entails. According to Astell, says Sarah Apetrei, “women’s 
education was designed to fully engage them in the reformation of society” (510). Thus, 
like Locke, she contended that an education should be modeled in a fashion that produces 
moral citizens, not traditionally “learned” ones. Critics like Patricia Springborg and 
Derek Taylor have outlined Astell’s commentary on Locke, though they tend to 
emphasize where their ideas diverge rather than where they converge. However, the 
imprints of Locke’s moralistic education upon Astell are apparent and more parallels 
persist. When Astell speaks of a woman’s will she mirrors Locke’s idea that a moralistic 
education allows individuals to place aside the pursuit of pleasure for nobler aspirations 
that will lead to more lasting gratification. Astell says, “Especially since the will is blind, 
and cannot choose but by the direction of the understanding; or to speak more properly, 
37 
 
since the soul always wills according as she understands, so that if she understands amiss, 
she wills amiss” (31).  Though “Locke’s sense-based epistemology” was theologically 
problematic, Astell demonstrates a grudging “respect” for his ideas by reiterating them 
almost exactly (Taylor 514). To merge Astell’s and Locke’s language, if a woman does 
not have foundational knowledge of right and wrong, if her mind is filled with frivolities, 
then her judgement will be flawed because it is based upon incomplete perceptions and 
sensations.  
 As the eighteenth century dawned and Locke’s cultural authority posthumously 
rose, the implementation of Lockean theories by female educationalists increased and 
also became more blatant. In the letters to her daughter, for example, Montagu frequently 
voices opinions that were informed by both Locke and Astell. Turner, for one, illustrates 
that Astell’s writings inspired Montagu’s educational theories; however, the shadow of 
Locke is also present in Montagu’s work.8 As Astell argued throughout her career and as 
Lady Montagu told her daughter, “Ignorance and a narrow education lay the foundations 
of vice” (Melville 15).9 Therefore, it should not be surprising that women too often fall 
into corruption. This belief directly mirrors the Lockean conception of the mind and 
morality because, as Locke argues, individuals lacking in experience and knowledge are 
incapable of making informed decisions that successfully set aside immediate 
gratification for postponed happiness. Reiterating both educationists’ arguments, 
Montagu asserts that “[t]he same characters are formed by the same lessons, which 
inclines me to think (if I dare say it) that nature has not placed us [women] in an inferior 
rank to men” (15). As the education of women in general is limited and focused upon 
                                                             
8 See Turner 26 and Pearson 140. 
9 This digital book does not have page numbers so I have placed chapter numbers in their place.  
38 
 
domestic and pageantry skills, this gendered “learning” continues to produce the same 
deficient character in women. Locke’s theory that ideas are a direct response to 
environment, as well as Astell’s recapitulation of this notion, is echoed by Montagu. 
Furthering these connections, Montagu speaks to her daughter about the positive 
influences experience has upon the domestic women:  
I do not doubt the frequency of assemblies has introduced a more enlarged way of 
thinking; it is a kind of public education, which I have always thought as 
necessary for girls as for boys. A woman married at five-and-twenty, from under 
the eye of a strict parent, is commonly as ignorant as she was at five; and no more 
capable of avoiding the snares, and struggling with the difficulties, she will 
infallibly meet with in the commerce of the world. (15).  
Similar to Locke, Montagu believes that the society holds “snares” that might entrap the 
underprepared individual into blind acceptance of custom or immorality. Though she 
does not stress the importance of carefully regulating one’s exposure to vice, as does 
Locke, she too argues that gaining a more comprehensive notion of the world aids in 
judgment. Montagu’s advice to witness the world is representative of the rhetorical 
arguments of later writers like Lennox and Austen who illuminate the dangers of 
inexperience and forced ignorance through their quixotic plots. Therefore, the strand of 
argument begun by Locke is picked up by educationalists like Astell and Montagu and 
finally passed down to female novelists like Lennox and Austen.  
 When Montagu gives advice for the education of her granddaughters, it is 
especially apparent that she is inspired by and in conversation with Locke’s schema for 
education. Montagu’s daughter, Mary, Countess of Bute—whom Charlotte Lennox 
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desired as a patroness—was frequently in epistolary conversation with her mother about 
the education of her daughters. The counsel Montagu grants her daughter frequently 
echoes Locke’s STCE and demonstrates his usefulness for female educationalists. For 
instance, in one letter to her daughter Montagu states,  
People commonly educate their children as they build their houses, according to 
some plan they think beautiful, without considering whether it is suited to the 
purposes for which they are designed. Almost all girls of quality are educated as if 
they were to be great ladies, which is often as little to be expected, as an 
immoderate heat of the sun in the north of Scotland. (15) 
Throughout the entirety of STCE, Locke maintains that children require a differentiated 
education that caters to the particular needs of the individual child; Montagu, taking her 
cue from Locke and using his authority to grant her own notions validity, also argues that 
a girl’s upbringing must be catered to her precise needs. With her advocacy of 
differentiation and experience-based education Montagu mimics, as Muller argues, “the 
Lockean” model where a “child emerges from a differentiated, exemplary education 
which includes the child in a functionally differentiated and rationally organized society 
(7). 
Through the juxtaposition of the Lockean notions of the mind and learning with 
female-authored educational writings, it is clear that the universality of Locke’s theories 
held latent potential that women harnessed to validate their arguments on the socially 
constructed nature of female ignorance and to argue for more equitable learning. 
Women’s appropriation of Locke’s ideas is logical because conduct books, sermons, and 
other societally significant texts, “engage[d] strongly with the educational theories 
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propounded by Locke”; during the eighteenth century, Locke became a cultural authority 
on virtuous education (Halsey 431). Because his methodology was already lauded by 
society as proper and moral, Locke was the ideal philosopher for women to utilize when 
advocated for their own learning. Consequently, proponents of female education, like 
Astell and Montagu, molded their educational notions to work within Locke’s greater 
theory of learning. However, more vital to this study is later novelists’ utilization of this 
same method.  As Katie Halsey illustrates, “by the end of the eighteenth century...writers 
of fiction were also beginning to question the unthinking assumption that a domestic 
education necessarily equipped a girl well for life in the wider world” (438). Though this 
notion is undoubtedly true, Halsey does not note that this trend is clear before the end of 
the century. As will be argued throughout the remainder of this thesis, female novelists 
like Lennox and Austen employed the structural form of the quixotic novel and the 
authoritative theories of Locke to reveal the deficient nature of traditional gendered 





“Rebellious Impulses Lurk Below”: The Philosophical and Educational Implications 
of Lennox’s The Female Quixote 
Making an impression on [Samuel Richardson] was essential, but she wouldn’t do 
it in the usual way that women impressed men at this time. Her mind was the 
commodity he would assess, and he had a draft of the early part of her second 
novel, The Female Quixote…He had received only a grammar school education, 
but she was at an even greater disadvantage, since her learning had been acquired 
mostly through her own devices.10 
                                                         Susan Carlile, Charlotte Lennox An 
                                                                                        Independent Mind, 2018 
   
For all that is to be found in Books, is not all built on true Foundations, nor 
always rightly deduc’d from the Principles it is pretended to be built on. Such an 
Examen as is requisite to discover that, every Reader’s mind is not forward to 
make ...Those who have got this Faculty, one may say, have got the true Key of 
Books, and the clue to lead them through the mizmaze of variety of Opinions and 
Authors to Truth and Certainty.11 
                                                         John Locke, The Conduct of  
                                                                                        Understanding, 1706 
 
Since the publication of Don Quixote in 1605, fictional heroes who “misread” 
reality because of their reliance on fiction are seen frequently as a symptom of shifting 
literary aesthetics; during the eighteenth century, the long-lasting dominance of the 
French romance was eclipsed by the realistic novel which became the new standard in 
Britain, as upheld by Defoe, Fielding, Richardson, and Sterne. Consequently, the 
eighteenth century also witnessed a growing number of novels that depicted characters 
carried away by reading romances. This emerging quixotic tradition allowed novelists to 
engage in the bifurcated cultural debate that surrounded these two genres. By depicting 
characters who strayed from all-important “reason” because of their romantic reading, 
                                                             
10 Emphasis my own.  
11 Emphasis my own.  
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novelists could simultaneously denounce the spuriousness of romance and bolster the 
moral authority of the novel.12 The Female Quixote, whose very title places it in the 
“misreading” tradition, is often contextualized within this debate. Jaqueline Pearson, for 
instance, demonstrates that through its comparison of romantic and novelistic forms, The 
Female Quixote “presents an intense but covert struggle between male and female over 
language and texts, over women’s writing and reading and the control of ‘modes of 
narration’” (203). However, studying Lennox’s Quixote only as it pertains to the greater 
arguments of genre and language strips the text of its most fundamental issue, 
education.13 As will be seen, scholars who study The Female Quixote often remark on the 
centrality of Arabella’s education, but, paradoxically, they rarely make education central 
to their own criticism. Remedying this oversight, more recent scholarship has expanded 
its scope to include Lennox’s commentary on female learning, thus tapping into a second 
and less-scrutinized cultural debate with which Lennox engages. As Sharon Smith Palo 
argues, “Lennox appropriates the representation of romance reading perpetuated by” 
quixotic novelists “in order to participate in other kinds of discourse, most notable that 
concerning women’s learning” (204). Moving this debate beyond The Female Quixote, 
Ana Sagal traces the “practice of reading and self-education” in Lennox’s texts, 
discovering a proper form of female education in Lennox’s periodical The Lady’s 
Museum (139). As this chapter will argue, an education-centered analysis of The Female 
Quixote illustrates not only how Lennox interacts with the discourse that surrounded 
female education but also how she appropriates John Locke’s ideas to argue against the 
                                                             
12 As Samuel Johnson defines in his dictionary, to reason is “to argue rationally; to deduce consequences 
justly from premises.” 
13 As defined in the introduction, education is learning with the intent “to make our natural faculty of 
reason both the better and the sooner to judge rightly between truth and error, good and evil” (Johnson, 
Dictionary, Vol. 1 677).   
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patriarchal model of ornamental female-learning; instead, Lennox demonstrates women’s 
latent intellectual potential, arguing for a balanced education, equal parts book-learning 
and experience.    
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Locke’s philosophies of the mind and 
education permeated eighteenth-century society and, consequently, whether through 
direct or indirect means, female educationalists often utilized his cultural authority to 
validate their own notions; so too did Charlotte Lennox. Though she does not directly 
name Locke as source, there are several aspects of Lennox’s biography that hint at her 
likely intentional dialogue with Lockean principles. One such contextual element is 
Lennox’s well-documented participation in the cultural discourse of her era. For instance, 
before Lennox became a novelists, playwright, and essayist, she was first a poet, and her 
poems engaged in both the cultural and philosophical debates of her age. In one of her 
earliest poems, “On reading HUTCHISON on the PASSIONS”—which, as Susan Carlile 
notes, could have been written as early as age eleven—Lennox responds to the 
philosophical notions of Francis Hutcheson’s through her own literary pursuits. Though 
this is not directly related to Locke, it does establish her proclivity for philosophical 
discourse (101). According to Carlile, this poem was a particular favorite “as she 
reprinted it four times,” notably, in her education-centered periodical The Lady’s Museum 
(101). However, Lennox’s cultural dialogue extends beyond a single poem. In “The ART 
of COQUETRY,” for instance, Lennox advised women to attract men by their wit rather 
than following the example of the female coquette, whose caricature was vilified in 
conduct books and sermons. Through her poetry, it is clear that from an astonishingly 
young age Lennox’s writing had a participatory nature that reflected upon both the 
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philosophical and cultural discourse of her time; as this chapter will demonstrate, analysis 
of The Female Quixote reveals that Lennox’s social discourse extends to Locke as well.  
Additionally, as Lennox came into her own as a writer, she developed a close 
relationship with Samuel Johnson, her mentor and staunch advocate; this association 
supports her connection with Lockean principles because Johnson himself was an ardent 
proponent of many of Locke’s ideas. In his singular A Dictionary of the English 
Language, Elizabeth Hedrick notes that Johnson 
not infrequently echoes both Lockean sentiments and Lockean phraseology, 
sometimes with a parenthetical off-handedness that reveals more effectively than 
direct quotation ever could, the extent to which Locke's notions had been 
incorporated into his own views. (422)  
Lennox, in the formative years of her career, was intimate with Johnson and, though to 
what extent is unknown, Johnson was certainly in contact with and assisting Lennox as 
she wrote The Female Quixote. Therefore, if, as Hedrick argues, Johnson internalized 
Lockean precepts, then it is likely that these same concepts were disseminated to Lennox 
during her work on Quixote. Lennox’s past reflections on philosophy and her connection 
to Johnson—who incorporated the precepts of Locke’s Essay into much of his work 
including The Rambler and Rasselas—is perhaps ancillary to the fact that Locke’s 
“thought everywhere pervades the eighteenth-century climate of opinion” (Watt 31). 
With these three contextual elements taken together—Lennox’s early participation in 
cultural debates, Johnson’s influence, and Locke’s general pervasiveness in society —the 
influence Lockean ideas had upon Lennox’s Quixote begs consideration.  
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 Analysis of The Female Quixote through the lens of Locke’s theories reveals the 
complex, and underrepresented, relationship that Lennox maintains with contemporary 
educational debates. By scrutinizing Arabella’s education, the learning of secondary 
female characters, and Arabella’s concluding “rehabilitation,” it is apparent that the ideas 
popularized by Locke—and then reaffirmed by female educationalists— are reflected 
upon by Lennox in The Female Quixote. Though scholars like Palo and Ruth Mack have 
connected Lennox’s Quixote to Locke’s philosophy, none have presented an in-depth 
exploration of how the two authors’ ideas on learning coalesce; more significantly, little 
has been done to understand how Lennox manipulates Locke as a source and what 
possible implications this has for her commentary on female potential.14 As this chapter 
will show, Lennox explicitly draws upon Locke’s rejection of innate ideas, his conception 
of how the mind garners false knowledge, his notion of reading, and his precepts for 
education to validate her own educational commentary. As Lennox delineates in The 
Female Quixote, genius without the proper education and grooming is highly corruptible; 
however, the answer is not—as it often was—to relegate woman to the isolated domestic 
sphere. Therefore, Quixote is a thought experiment which implements the Lockean 
concepts of the mind and education and then asks what happens to the isolated and 
domestic woman within this model, a schema that promotes careful instruction paired 
with experience? In answer, Lennox renders Arabella as an intelligent and accomplished 
woman who lacks the sagacity to make sound judgments only because her experiences 
are restricted by her isolated and careless instruction. In writing The Female Quixote, 
Lennox herself not only seems to contemplate the problems of women’s education but 
also works to create a solution, one that strikes a balance between isolated self-education 
                                                             
14 See Palo and Carlile.  
46 
 
and experiential learning. As will be seen, Lennox presents the antidote to flawed female 
learning in her educational periodical The Lady’s Museum, which presents a  variety of 
reading meant to enlarge the female mind. Because the quixotic model presents an ideal 
platform, Lennox utilizes it to affirm that, according to Locke’s principles of ideas and 
education, women must be granted careful instruction that promotes female learning and 
morality. Thus, in The Female Quixote, Lennox plays a hermeneutic game with her 
readers, manipulating the quixotic form to advocate for women’s education and to 
illustrate that those who fail to “read” the necessity of women’s learning within her text 
are the true quixotic figures. 
The Female Quixotic Model: Where Women’s Learning and Reading Converge 
By their very nature, educational arguments rendered in quixotic texts are 
centered upon reading; that is, they focus on reading and the implications that it had for 
learning. Therefore, to comprehend fully Lennox’s assertions regarding education 
necessitates analysis of eighteenth-century views on women’s reading in conjunction 
with those on female learning. As Pearson carefully delineates in Women's Reading in 
Britain, 1750-1835: A Dangerous Recreation, women’s literacy in the eighteenth century 
was often a point of political, moral, and ideological controversy; consequently, 
exploring the literary responses of female authors like Lennox and Austen to this 
patriarchally biased conversation, one that targeted learned women, is a compelling 
academic endeavor. However, reading was only such a subversive topic because it is the 
foundation of learning and, as Locke’s authoritative principles illustrate, has the potential 
to shape moral character. Partially in response to the Enlightenment principles of the 
tabula rasa—and Locke’s signification of the mind as exceedingly malleable—British 
society experienced a “moral panic” over female reading and its negative potential for 
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women’s learning (Vogrinčič 106). In her article on gendered reading, Ana Vogrinčič 
defines “moral panic” as “a heightened level of concern over the (supposed) behaviour of 
a certain group or category, and the consequences that this behaviour presumably causes 
for the rest of society” (106). Britain, as the discourse of conduct books, sermons, and 
periodicals clearly demonstrates, was greatly concerned about the reading of women and 
the “dangerous psychological affects” and immorality that female reading might cause 
(109). Because women were the protectors of virtuous domesticity, the exterior forces of 
books entering the home challenged “the ideology of separate spheres” and, thus, was 
thought dangerous and worthy of “moral panic” (Pearson 2).  
Although “men's reading was shown to facilitate intellectual development,” 
women’s reading was often depicted as debilitating to both women’s minds and social 
welfare (Pearson 4). However, what is not noted in studies of women’s reading—like 
those undertaken by Pearson and Vogrinčič—is the prominence of Locke’s theories of 
education and ideas within the age’s commentary on reading; although the human mind 
was a blank slate, the misogynistic worry was that women were not capable of processing 
read information and transforming it into moral knowledge with the same accuracy as 
men. James Fordyce, for instance, argued that women’s reading can “swallow up, 
amongst the young and gay, all sober reflection, every rational study, with every virtuous 
principle; and to introduce in their room impure ideas, extravagant desires, and notion of 
happiness alike fantastic and false” (Character 48). In fact, according to Fordyce, girls’ 
improper reading material can make “the whole system of life seems converted into 
romance” (Character 48). However, the process of restricting women’s reading to 
maintain morality also alienates them from the most valuable tool that women had to 
supplement their education, books. Therefore, eighteenth-century thoughts on women’s 
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reading and women’s learning, as well as those on the Enlightenment principles of the 
mind, were naturally in conversation with one another. 
Posthumously, Locke made his own important contribution to the eighteenth-
century conception of reading, contextualizing reading within his notions of the mind and 
education; these theories, as Richard Ritter notes, were significant for depictions of 
female reading well into the nineteenth century (17). In 1706, his essay Of the Conduct of 
the Understanding was published; in this text, Locke dedicates an entire section to the 
conduct of readers and the impact reading has upon the mind, saying,  
Some people are assiduous in reading, but don’t advance their knowledge much 
by it. They are delighted with the stories they read and perhaps can repeat them, 
taking all that they read to be nothing but history, narrative; but they don’t reflect 
on it, don’t make observations to themselves on the basis of what they read; so 
they are little improved. (Conduct 187-8)  
Here, Locke unveils the most essential aspect of successful reading, reflection. In so 
doing, he also justifies one of the most fundamental arguments in Lennox’s and Austen’s 
quixotic works: reading in a vacuum, without proper reflection or experiences to assist 
one in interpretation, is indeed hazardous. According to Locke, reading is one way by 
which to furnish the mind with the “vast store” of knowledge necessary to inform moral 
decisions (Essay 2.1.2). After reading, “one may say that they have the materials of 
knowledge”; however, simply garnering the goods for learning does not constitute a 
moral education (Conduct 188). As Locke argues, the learning found in books, “like 
building materials bring no benefit if they are simply left to lie in a heap” (Conduct 188). 
In order to take one’s reading and metamorphose it into moral learning, the reader must 
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reflect upon the contents of the book, hold these subjects up for judgement against other 
images he or she has of the world, and determine whether the information brings the 
reader closer to “Truth and Certainty” (Conduct 193). As Locke and, later, Lennox and 
Austen demonstrate, whether male or female, it is only through this participatory reading 
that the contents of a book become fruitful.  
 In her letters to her daughter, Montagu echoes this same notion that proper 
reading is a dialogue between reader and text, further exemplifying the associations 
between Locke, female educationalists, and the potential of his theories for women. 
When giving advice for the education of her granddaughters, Montagu addresses reading 
and, more important to any study of quixotic texts, specifically the reading of romance: 
If any of them are fond of reading, I would not advise you to hinder them (chiefly 
because it is impossible) seeing poetry, plays, or romances; but accustom them to 
talk over what they read, and point out to them, as you are very capable of doing, 
the absurdity often concealed under fine expressions, where the sound is apt to 
engage the admiration of young people. (Melville 15)   
Almost exactly mirroring Locke, Montagu advises that the information acquired through 
reading be mulled over, examined, and understood within its proper context: fictionalized 
exaggerations of life or useful knowledge. Importantly, she does not mandate that 
romances are withheld from girls but rather that a conversation must be maintained 
between the reader, the fiction, and reality. Through this didactic analysis, learners 
safeguard themselves against adopting morally harmful ideas. Montagu says that in 
romance there is “absurdity often concealed under fine expressions”; however, false ideas 
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obscured within pretty language are found not only in romances but in the patriarchal 
conception of “woman” as well.  
Building upon Locke’s concept of false ideas, eighteenth-century British society 
asked what happens if the weaker sex, “woman,” was not well-educated enough or even 
equipped with the intellectual potential to perceive what she read effectively. Quixotism 
was often the answer. Rather than reading a text as fiction and absorbing only the 
valuable lessons, women were thought to conflate romantic renderings of heroines and 
the realities of their own lives, absorbing “absurdity” as part of their identity. As Pearson 
eloquently puts it,  
In popular physiology and psychology, the female intellect was viewed as, like 
the female body, soft and fragile, with female ego-boundaries dangerously 
permeable...As a result, women were deemed vulnerable to excessively 
identificatory reading practices―‘this identifying propensity’―which might 
endanger their fragile sense of rational selfhood. (85) 
Employing Locke’s theory of ideas for patriarchal ends, commentators of the age argued 
that women were especially susceptible to imitating and “inoculating [the] wrong ideas of 
love and life” that they learned from improper books—of course, what constituted 
improper reading was polemical in and of itself (Vogrinčič 109). Further, women’s 
acceptance of ideas learned from reading was perceived as damaging to their minds and, 
more important by contemporary standards, to their virtue. “For some commentators, 
female reading was dangerous because it could distract from domestic duties or 
transgress the limits of a private sphere” (Pearson 2). For others, “female reading…[was] 
sexual” and, as such, was dangerous (2). However, in almost all cases, reading held 
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conceivable peril for women’s morality, and, as Locke’s moral education argues, human 
immorality endangers the social structure. A woman’s mind was perceived as highly 
susceptible to acceptance of immorality; thus, some like Fordyce argued that there were 
“very few [books]…that you can read with safety,” going so far as to say that many 
books are so vile “that she who can bear to peruse them must in her soul be a prostitute” 
(124-25). Therefore, it is clear that, as Vogrinčič notes, a moral panic surrounded female 
readership and learning and the implication these might have for patriarchal society.  
Consequently, and paradoxically then, patriarchal commentators employed 
Locke’s notion of the mind to illustrate that women could easily gain false perceptions of 
the world through their reading; however, they also denied women the model of 
education that Locke prescribed as the cure for such misperceptions. Though men’s 
literacy rose along with women’s, “in the age's literary discourses, misreading tend[ed] to 
be gendered as feminine” (Pearson 5). Emblematic of this cultural trend, Lennox’s The 
Female Quixote, Eaton Standard Barrett’s The Heroine, Maria Edgeworth’s Angelina, 
and Austen’s Northanger Abbey all center upon female quixotism or misreading. Though 
misogynistic, this trend is logical. Locke had convincingly demonstrated the moral 
dangers of isolation, deficient education, and the acceptance of false knowledge; 
therefore, it was valid to fear the hazards of women’s reading, but only within this 
patriarchally limited view. Locke argued that “Judging is, as it were, balancing an 
account, and determining on which side the odds lie,” but, as male and female 
commentators noted, if a woman does not have the experience to balance the odds 
adequately, she is sure to make flawed decisions that will likely lead to moral corruption 
(Essay 2.21.69.ii). As Lady Sarah Pennington advised her daughter, “You are just 
entering, my dear Girl, into a World full of Deceit and Falsehood, where few Persons or 
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Things appear as they really are” (10). Like Locke, she argues that “it requires long 
Experience, and a penetrating Judgement to discover the Truth” and to avoid immorality 
(10). However, because authoritative men—like James Fordyce or John Gregory— 
argued that books lead to the corruption of the mind, even people who obviously read 
Locke, like Pennington, strictly regulated female reading.  
Thus, commentators on women’s learning and reading used the malleability of the 
mind to advocate against female self-education through reading. Pennington, for instance, 
goes on, in overtly Lockean language, to urge her daughter not to read novels and to 
“Look on every Day as a Blank Sheet of Paper put into your Hands to be filled up…be 
careful therefore…what you may read” (20). However, this reasoning contains one 
sizable crack in its foundation; Locke himself recommends a careful, adequate, and 
varied education as the remedy for such flawed judgement, yet British society denied all 
but an ornamental education to women. Thus, ironically, those parroting the need for 
careful and strict gendered education for women were both the cause of and the biggest 
critics of female misperception of books. Richard Ritter, in his book Imagining Women 
Readers 1789-1820: Well Regulated Minds, notes that even a century after his death, 
there is a perceivable and “lasting impression that Locke’s work left upon accounts of 
women’s reading,” because he is used by both the commentators who warn against 
unwise reading and the women who are advocating for equitable learning—like Astell, 
Montague, Lennox, Wollstonecraft, and Austen (17).  
As Lennox and Austen demonstrate, however, writers and readers “can use a 
range of resisting strategies to unsettle…authority” and to appropriate texts and 
arguments “for their own purposes” (Pearson 17). Further, participation in this societal 
debate of female “misreading” does not necessitate acceptance of its patriarchal stances. 
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As will be demonstrated through later analysis, Lennox and Austen both appropriate the 
Lockean principles of the mind and education along with the quixotic form—where 
flawed reading leads to misperception—to participate subversively in the pervasive 
cultural debates that surrounded female reading and learning. Through this process, they 
demonstrate that a balance must be struck between female literary-education and 
experience; too much of either, experience or isolated reading, will tip the delicate 
balance in favor of immorality. By following the Lockean model, an individual should 
learn how to utilize sensations and perceptions to gain experience; only then can those 
experiences be employed to make judgements that take one closer to morality. 
Unfortunately, as Lennox’s Arabella and, later, Austen’s Catherine demonstrate, this is 
too often not the case for women because of “the fault and negligence of elder People”; 
that is to say, because of the social constructs that confined female existence, an adequate 
Lockean education for women was not simply achieved (Locke, STCE 115).  
Fashioning Arabella: The Misuse of Locke’s Model of Education     
The very foundation of Lennox’s The Female Quixote, as evidenced by the 
dedication and first chapter, heralds itself as a work concerned with two things: women’s 
education and society’s flawed methods of addressing such issues. Lennox dedicates her 
learning-centered book to the Earl of Middlesex, a powerful man whom Lennox credits 
with giving “Standard to the National Taste” but who also, and likely of more 
importance, gave one of Lennox’s poems as a birthday present to the Princess of Wales 
(Daziel 338). Lennox begins this dedication, “SUCH is the Power of Interest over almost 
every Mind, that no one is long without Arguments to prove any Position which is 
ardently wished to be true, or to justify any Measures which are dictated by Inclination” 
(1). Lennox lived in a polemic time. And too often during this age, as she aptly notes, 
54 
 
individuals let fancy guide their beliefs and then, illogically, push these unfounded 
principles onto others’ “minds,” using “any measures” as justification (1). However, as 
Locke argues in his Essay, individuals should not blindly accept social customs but 
empirically analyze them to determine their validity. Lennox, as a woman writer, held 
stakes in several of the key debates of her age, specifically, those of women’s learning, 
reading, writing, and women’s general place in the public sphere. The dedication of 
Quixote indicates that she is actively and intentionally opening a dialogue between her 
text and the ongoing social discourses, specifically, as the novel itself illustrates, with the 
debates that surrounded women. Through The Female Quixote, Lennox holds up for 
inspection several patriarchal ideas about women—namely the notions that women are 
innately inferior, that their education should be severely constrained, and that reading in 
and of itself is dangerous—and, as will be seen, once analyzed empirically, these notions 
are found wanting. After all, in quixotic texts “what is [really] under scrutiny is women’s 
stake in culture” (Pearson 198). By adopting Lockean principles and using the quixotic 
model, Lennox undertakes an epistemological project to scrutinize the customary 
“knowledge” that dichotomized men and women and signified woman as the “second 
sex.”  
Although Lennox’s dedication does not specifically note education as the 
principal argument of The Female Quixote, the Fielding-like subheading of her first 
chapter does. As her book commences, Lennox forewarns that the reader will discover 
“Some useless Additions to a fine Lady’s Education [and] The Bad Effects of a Whimsical 
Study” (5). Thus, from the start, she asserts to her readers that in this education-centric 
text she will contribute her voice to the tide of “Interest” that dominated eighteenth-
century society and “prove [her] position” through her heroine’s education; however, 
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unlike those who speak purely from “Inclination,” Lennox uses Locke’s cultural 
authority, theories, and empirical method to validate her beliefs evidentially (1).  
Despite the centrality of education within The Female Quixote, scholars have 
done little to analyze the particulars of the protagonist Arabella’s own early learning, 
instead focusing solely on her subsequent romance reading. Sagal, for instance, notes that 
during Arabella’s formative years her “father takes personal responsibility for her 
education at a young age” but says little else about the details of Arabella’s upbringing 
(146). Even those who have made a connection between Lennox and Locke, like Palo and 
Mack, denote Quixote as “a somewhat exaggerated illustration of Locke’s notion 
concerning the way simple ideas are imprinted on the ‘white paper’” of the mind (Palo 
206). As demonstrated earlier, this education-centric text has been analyzed more 
extensively for arguments on genre and the effects of romance reading than for education 
itself.  Although many scholars do note in passing that The Female Quixote is 
commenting on women’s education, their lack of close analysis of education obscures 
Lennox’s argument that Locke’s schema for education cannot work for women if they are 
not as carefully educated as men and also allowed experiences to supplement their 
learning.15 
          To comprehend effectually Lennox’s dialogue with contemporary educational 
arguments, Arabella’s isolated situation and the impact it has upon her mind require 
contextualization within Locke’s theory of learning. As the book begins, Lennox first 
presents the location of Arabella’s upbringing and the circumstances that compelled her 
family’s seclusion. After an ill-fated encounter at court, Arabella’s father, the Marquis, 
                                                             
15 See Carlile, Hall, Palo, and Sagal.  
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resolved “to quit all society whatever, and devote the rest of his life to solitude and 
privacy,” noting society’s baseness as the catalyst (Lennox 5). Because of his disgust 
with social custom, the Marquis removes himself and, by extension, his daughter from 
both the harmful and the instructive aspects of the world. In so doing, he sets into motion 
the isolated and thus flawed upbringing of Arabella, which, for Lennox, is representative 
of the private domestic life that society expected of women; however, as Locke and 
Lennox both demonstrate, total seclusion is problematic because it severely limits the 
experiences the mind obtains.  
 Arabella’s ostensible isolation is important to Lennox’s argument for two 
reasons: First, in the social dichotomies of men and women, of public and private, 
women were signified as private. Women’s assignment to the domestic or private sphere 
was then used as justification for the inadequate education they received. Second, Locke 
expends much effort in delineating the importance of experiencing things and places 
outside of one’s realm. Indiscriminate adoption of flawed social customs and an inability 
to perceive effectively, for Locke, are the natural consequences of isolation. Therefore, 
when the Marquis chooses the place “of his retreat… in a very remote province of the 
kingdom, in the neighbourhood of a small village, and several miles distant from any 
town,” this decision holds implications for both Arabella’s educating and Lennox’s 
commentary on eighteenth-century women’s learning (Lennox 5-6). Not only is Arabella 
raised within a remote area of Britain, but she is also situated away from even the 
smallest town. Completing this absolute seclusion is the Marquis’s refusal to “admit any 
company whatever” (6). This action, of course, runs counter to Locke’s suggestion that 
while at home, a child should be introduced to “the company of …Genteel and well-bred 
people” to grant him or her access to moral persons—other than the parent or tutor— 
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who convey varied life experiences to the child (STCE 45-6). In glaring contrast, 
Arabella, like the domestic and, thus, private women, is not in contact with any such 
persons. Lennox goes to great lengths to demonstrate the totality of Arabella’s isolation 
and the Marquis’s inadherence to Locke’s percepts because both elements are the crux of 
her later quixotism—and the arguments Lennox makes for a balanced female education 
in general.  
 As Locke argues in his authoritative STCE and as Lennox here appropriates the 
idea, wisdom stems from the “application of Mind, and Experience together”; 
consequently, those denied access to experience are also deprived of “wisdom” (102). 
This concept, that remoteness leads to ignorance, is fundamental to Lennox’s quixotic 
plot and to her argument for a balanced female education. In The Female Quixote, 
Lennox almost scientifically designs Arabella’s existence, carefully controlling the 
variables that influence her character. This, of course, is part of her Lockean thought 
experiment. Locke says that “Improvement in Wisdom and Prudence [comes] by seeing 
Men, and conversing with People of Tempers, Customs, and Ways of living, different 
from one another (152). However, society relegated women to the domestic sphere and 
then denied them everything but a gendered education that vastly constricted experience. 
Unveiling the exacting contradictions between Locke’s widely accepted ideas and 
society’s treatment of women, Lennox applies Locke’s theory of the mind onto the 
socially constructed, isolated woman through the character of Arabella; the resulting 
female quixote is indeed inferior to man because she lacks the two buttresses of a well-
rounded Lockean education, experience and careful, moral learning.   
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The adverse effects of Arabella’s isolation are compounded by the Marquis’s 
failed attempt to implement Locke’s model for educating children. Though the Marquis 
sets out judiciously to educate Arabella using Locke’s model, he errs in his execution: 
At Four Years of Age he took her from under the Direction of the Nurses and 
Women appointed to attend her, and permitted her to receive no Part of her 
Education from another, which he was capable of giving her himself. He taught 
her to read and write in a very few Months; and, as she grew older, finding in her 
an uncommon Quickness of Apprehension, and an Understanding capable of great 
Improvements, he resolved to cultivate so promising a Genius with the utmost 
Care; and, as he frequently, in the Rapture of paternal Fondness, expressed 
himself, render her Mind as beautiful as her Person was lovely. (6) 
The Marquis’s intentions are in keeping with Locke’s stated precepts: Arabella is closely 
supervised by the Marquis in her home-schooling; her teacher—in this case, the Marquis 
himself—provides careful instruction; and Arabella’s mind is given just as much 
consideration as her physical appearance. However, execution does not always mirror 
intent. Although the Marquis, or at least Lennox, appears to know Locke’s strictures, he 
fails to bring them to fruition and, therefore, fails to educate his daughter effectually. 
Instead, the result is a traditionally gendered education that renders Arabella ill-equipped 
to face the world or reason fully. In this respect, the Marquis is analogous to the many 
critics of female learning; he uses Locke as his model yet fails to recognize that Locke’s 
schema for education is not compatible with society’s traditionally secluded and 
gendered learning.  
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In consequence, as part of the “utmost care” he extends to Arabella’s learning, the 
Marquis incorporates all of the traditional trappings of a pageantry or gendered 
education, thus leaving Arabella “accomplished” but also quixotic (6). In his curriculum, 
the Marquis includes learning to speak French and Italian, to heighten one’s “Art,” to 
dress in “magnificent” fashion, to dance, and to play music (7). As Brigitte Glaser argues, 
all pursuits “such as French, dancing, music, drawing,” are merely “ornamental 
accomplishments” that do little to further the mind or morality (192). Therefore, the 
Marquis’s ostensibly careful and closely regulated schema for education is just as 
ineffectual as other models for female instruction. This example of inadequate learning 
holds two points of significance for Lennox: First, Locke’s model mandates not only that 
parents should cautiously watch over their children but also that they must monitor the 
moral lessons imparted to them, a vital step the Marquis neglects. Second, the example of 
Arabella’s education is exemplary of what patriarchal society does to women; it 
“shelters” them for their own protection, takes hegemonic control over what learning is 
allowed to them, and then condemns them for their inability to reason adequately. As will 
be demonstrated throughout Lennox’s text, the consequence of such sexual politics is a 
weakened or quixotic woman; however, as Arabella demonstrates and Locke took great 
pains to prove, inadequacy is not innate, and proper reading can be the “Key” to 
understanding (Conduct 193).  
The only aspect of Arabella’s early instruction left to analyze is the effects thay 
her seclusion and her pageantry education have upon her ability to transform her limited 
sensations and perceptions into well-founded knowledge. After Lennox outlines 
Arabella’s patriarchally administered education, the narrator steps in, stating, “[I]t is not 
to be doubted, but she would have made a great Proficiency in all useful Knowledge, had 
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not her whole Time been taken up by another Study”—that other study is, of course, 
centered upon ornamental “virtues” (7). Despite her flawed education, Arabella shows 
intellectual promise. As a result, the Marquis “permitted her…the Use of his Library, in 
which, unfortunately for her, were great Store of Romances” (7). As a direct consequence 
of Arabella’s seclusion and patriarchal education, she cannot juxtapose her reading 
material against reality because she has too little experience of the world. Therefore, 
romance reading is a corrupting force that Arabella takes to be history. Even this quixotic 
reaction to romance is predicted by Locke. As he argues, some readers who do not 
contemplate their reading properly may “take all that they read to be nothing but history” 
(Conduct 14). However, Lennox demonstrates throughout the text not that Arabella’s 
issue is her inability to analyze a text but that her deficiency in experiences leaves her 
with little against which to judge the material she reads. For this reason, “The surprising 
Adventures” with which romance is filled “proved a most pleasing Entertainment to a 
young Lady, who was wholly secluded from the World; who had no other Diversion” 
(Lennox 7). As Lennox demonstrates, the “innate” inferiority of women does not cause 
Arabella’s quixotic misreading. Rather, a patriarchal education that limits observed 
wisdom is to blame for Arabella’s “inability” to inscribe her tabula rasa effectively as a 
man might. Therefore, in response to Lennox’s didactic question—what happens to the 
domestic woman under the Lockean model of learning—the character of Arabella elicits 
the answer. Despite her fine reasoning ability and superior virtue, as will be later 
demonstrated, Arabella’s “Ideas, from the Manner of her Life, and the Objects around 
her, had taken a romantic Turn; and, supposing Romances were real Pictures of Life, 
from them she drew all her Notions and Expectations” because the Marquis—a stand in 
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for the patriarchal man—denies her the other half of Locke’s educational model, 
experience (7).  
Hence, from the start Lennox elucidates her argument clearly: women require an 
adequate education because when basic experiences and learning are denied to them, 
their natural potential is squandered, and immorality ensues. To validate this opinion, she 
appropriates Locke’s models of education and the mind. Locke himself evinced the ease 
with which mankind is corrupted; as he argued, only education and experience operating 
in conjunction can arm man against such perversion. At large, British society endorsed 
Locke’s ideas and the remedy he presented―for men. However, when women were at 
issue, moralistic commentators instead argued to restrict experience and learning to 
prevent vice from entering the female, or domestic, sphere. As John Gregory makes clear 
in his A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters, women’s “superior delicacy, [their] modesty, 
and the usual severity of [their] education, preserve [them], in a great measure, from any 
temptation to those vices to which we are most subjected (38). This severe education 
limited the sensations and perceptions allowed to women with the stated intent of 
protecting them from immorality; however, this runs in direct opposition to Locke’s 
precepts. Thus, while it was generally accepted that women’s “Virgin purity is of that 
delicate nature, that it cannot hear certain things without contamination,” it was also 
thought that men must go out into the world and gain experience to better their ability to 
judge reasonably (Gregory 68). This phallocentric contradiction, paramount in The 
Female Quixote, is what Lennox argues against through her heroine, Arabella.  
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The “Useful Knowledge” of Books: The Chasm Between Miss Glanville’s and 
Arabella’s Education   
As the novel progresses, Lennox introduces the character of Miss Glanville, who 
is both the foil of Arabella and the incarnation of the “woman” engendered by a purely 
ornamental education that does not contain even flawed reading. Through the 
juxtaposition of Arabella—isolated, but literary— against Miss Glanville—experienced, 
but unread—it is apparent that though Arabella is rendered a quixote by her reading, she 
is also granted exceptional “useful knowledge,” a keen eye for virtuous traits such as 
honor and chastity, and a wit far superior to the unread Miss Glanville (Lennox 48).16 To 
set up this comparison, Lennox slowly weaves in the education that fashioned Miss 
Glanville’s particularly immoral female character. Having spent time in London and 
Bath, Miss Glanville, unlike Arabella, is aware of the world. However, akin to Arabella, 
Miss Glanville was given an ornamental education and is, by eighteenth-century 
standards, considered accomplished. Antithetical to Lennox’s heroine, Miss Glanville 
does not supplement her learning with reading of any sort. Because of this deficient 
reading, Lennox implements Miss Glanville's flawed character to illustrate that “it is the 
‘fine Lady’s Education’ enjoyed by most of the other female[s]...that proves truly 
useless” (Palo 205). Although other scholars have noted the moral failings of Miss 
Glanville in comparison to Arabella’s virtuous nature and have attributed these 
differences to Arabella’s literary education, very little analysis has been done of 
Arabella’s exceptional useful knowledge juxtaposed against Miss Glanville’s markedly 
deficient learning. Through analysis of several episodes in the text, it is clear that, though 
Arabella’s isolation has rendered her a quixote, her reading has also given her superior 
                                                             
16 Here, I use “useful knowledge,” as Lennox does, to refer to knowledge gained of real-world subjects like 
history, geography, astronomy, etc.   
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virtue, knowledge of subjects like geography and history, and a wit that Miss Glanville 
does not possess. The resulting commentary suggests that neither the education of 
Arabella―which is driven by reading―nor the learning of Miss Glanville―which is 
based on experience―is entirely efficacious. Instead, a balance is desirable. As Locke 
demonstrates, and Lennox then adopts and applies to the lives of women, only a 
combination of learning and experience coupled with a careful eye for the moralistic 
lessons found within both can produce a rational and responsible citizen—or a self-
actualized woman.   
To compare the flawed Miss Glanville to Arabella effectively requires an 
understanding of the virtues and defects of Arabella’s adult character. Lennox makes 
apparent from Arabella’s many “adventures” that quixotism has swept her away almost 
entirely: Arabella, for instance, imagines that a thieving servant is a gentleman in 
disguise who debases himself simply to be in her presence, she compares the most trivial 
events of her life to the heroic fictions found in her books, and she even adopts the 
ostentatious speech of a romantic heroine. Even Arabella’s routine conversation with Mr. 
Glanville exemplifies this “romantic Turn” (Lennox 7). When Mr. Glanville asks Lucy, 
Arabella’s servant, to allow him a private conversation with Arabella, her propensity for 
quixotism is apparent:  
Arabella, blushing at an Insolence so uncommon… I pray you, Sir, pursued she 
frowning, What Intercourse of Secrets is there between you and me, that you 
expect I should favour you with a private Conversation? An Advantage which 
none of your Sex ever boasted to have gained from me; and which, haply, you 
should be the last upon whom I should bestow it. (31) 
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Everything from her language, her ideas of proper courtship, and her self-aggrandizing 
authority are permeated by romance. However, despite her quixotic and comical 
tendencies, Arabella is also described, by both the narrator and other characters, as 
singularly accomplished in both intelligence and virtue. As Sagal argues, reading is “vital 
for a woman’s self-education,” and although Arabella lacks the requisite experience to 
differentiate between fact and fiction, she has still gleaned value from her reading (141). 
In fact, Sagal maintains that “Arabella’s good qualities are explicitly connected to her 
romance-reading habit” (146-7). Arabella herself, in a conversation with Mr. Glanville, 
her future husband, argues this very thing: 
For heaven's sake, cousin, resumed Arabella, laughing, how have you spent your 
Time; and to what Studies have you devoted your Hours, that you could find none 
to spare for the Perusal of Books from which all useful Knowledge may be drawn; 
which give us the most shining Examples of Generosity, Courage, Virtue, and 
Love; which regulate our Actions, form our Manners, and inspire us with a noble 
Desire. (Lennox 48) 
Arabella describes books as the models of virtue; thus, it is apparent that she herself is in 
dialogue with books and models her own merits on these texts. As Sagal and Lennox both 
demonstrate, reading, whether romantic or not, is at the root of Arabella’s exceptional 
traits, especially those with which Mr. Glanville’s is in awe. Like Locke, Arabella 
promotes reading as an exemplary form of learning that fosters morality. Unfortunately, 
because she lacks foundational knowledge of society at large, she cannot “reflect” 
adequately upon her reading and compare it with images of reality as Locke suggests 
(Conduct 193). As a result, Mr. Glanville meets a woman whose “Head is turned” yet 
who has “more Wit than her whole sex besides” (Lennox 41).  
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 In stark contrast, it is ostensible from Miss Glanville’s entrance into the quixotic 
novel that she is inferior to Arabella in manner, wit, and virtue; as is demonstrated 
through Lennox’s delineation of Miss Glanville, these deficiencies are a direct response 
to her purely ornamental education, which has restricted reading and promoted 
materialism in its place. Though Arabella also received a traditionally gendered 
education, she reads extensively; therefore, it is clear that for Lennox reading makes all 
the difference. This is discernable from Miss Glanville’s first appearance in the story 
where the narrator informs the reader that Miss Glanville is both vain and a coquettish:  
[U]pon the sight of Arabella, [she] discovered some appearance of astonishment 
and chagrin...As Miss Charlotte [Glanville] had a large share of coquetry in her 
composition, and was fond of beauty in none of her own sex but herself, she was 
sorry to see Lady Bella possessed of so great a share. (Lennox 80)  
Lennox consistently shows that coquetry, vanity, envy, and other unvirtuous traits are 
fundamental to Miss Glanville’s character. This impression is only strengthened after 
Arabella compliments her appearance and “Miss Glanville received her praises with great 
politeness but could not find in her heart to return them” (80). Even from a succinct 
introduction to Miss Glanville, it is evident that despite Arabella’s isolation and her 
romance reading, her disposition is superior to Miss Glanville’s. As Lennox didactically 
conveys, this disparity between the two women has everything to do with education. As 
James Fordyce argues in his Sermons to Young Women, “[T]here is not perhaps in the 
whole science of female vanity, female luxury, or female falsehood, a single article that is 
not taught” (10). Thus, like Locke and Lennox, Fordyce marks education as the key cause 
of immorality—as demonstrated by Miss Glanville. However, Fordyce blames mothers 
and not the deficient nature of gendered learning for these failings (10). As Lennox 
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personifies through both Miss Glanville and Arabella, it is the patriarchal construct of 
gendered education—which cultivates corporeal concerns like singing, dancing, and 
fashion above intellectual stimulation—that is inherently flawed, not woman herself.  
As the novel progresses, the failings of Miss Glanville’s experience-based and 
decorative education are only confirmed by Miss Glanville’s iniquitous behavior towards 
men. In a confused exchange between the coquettish Miss Glanville and the quixotic 
Arabella, Miss Glanville takes offense because she believes that Arabella means to “to 
sneer at [Miss Glanville’s] great Eagerness to make Conquests, and the Liberties she 
allowed herself in, which had probably come to [Arabella’s] Knowledge” (Lennox 89). 
Although this was not Arabella’s intent, Miss Glanville’s guilt-ridden assumptions reveal 
her own indiscretions. It is the advice given by men and women alike that young women 
must “[n]ever amuse [themselves] with turning Coquet” because it is a short-lived 
pleasure that ruins the “reputation” and calls for a “Character of Deceit” (De Pompadour 
76). As Locke denotes in his Essay, morality compels an individual to place immediate 
pleasures aside in the pursuit of greater happiness later. However, Miss Glanville—the 
product of an ornamental education, confined reading, and ample worldly experiences—
falls prey to the trap of vanity and uses her ornamental studies to seduce men, placing 
immediate desires ahead of prolonged, moral contentment. Thus, Lennox makes plain 
that if women do not enlarge their minds through literary learning, diverse experiences 
are indeed harmful to their morality, further driving home the Lockean need for both 
education and experience.  
In addition to her unvirtuous character, Miss Glanville also lacks the useful 
wisdom that Arabella consistently displays, a failure that is again ascribable to her lack of 
a literary education; this is notably demonstrated in the chapter “[w]hich treats of the 
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Olympic Games” (Lennox 79). In this section, Miss Glanville proposes to attend horse 
racing as a diversion from the country solitude which she cannot abide. Ignorant of this 
sport and the vice that often accompanies gambling, Arabella asks if it is similar to the 
Olympic Games; Miss Glanville, whose “reading had been very confined,” does not 
know what the Olympics are (82). As an explanation, Arabella gives a detailed and 
accurate answer:  
The Olympic Games, Miss, said Arabella, so called from Olympia, a city near 
which they were performed, in the Plains of Elis, consisted of Foot and Chariot-
Races; Combats with the Cestus; Wrestling, and other Sports. They were 
instituted in Honour of the Gods and Heroes; and were therefore termed sacred, 
and were considered as a Part of Religion.  (82) 
Although this learning originates from her romance reading, the knowledge she gains is 
true and precise. Conversely, Miss Glanville comments that she has “never read about 
any such Things” (82). This prioritization of materialistic pleasures over mental 
stimulation is typical of Miss Glanville and symptomatic of “the dubious value of 
ornamental ‘accomplishments’” (Glaser 431). Arabella, again signifying her intellectual 
prowess, goes on to engage in conversation with Mr. Glanville over Grecian history “for 
two hours,” thus evidencing that Arabella gains tangible and extensive knowledge from 
her reading, no matter its genre (Lennox 83). While this tête-à-tête transpires, the narrator 
takes note that “Miss Glanville (to whom all they said was quite unintelligible) diverted 
herself with humming a Tune…which proved no interruption to the more rational 
entertainment of her brother and Arabella” (83). Unable to match the literary education of 
Arabella or the masculine learning of her brother, Miss Glanville has no option but to fall 
back upon an ornamental skill, singing.  
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 In a second demonstrative conversation, Lennox reasserts Arabella’s superior 
knowledge and reasoning ability by juxtaposing her ideas against those of Miss Glanville, 
whose reading has been so restricted by patriarchal notions of education that she does not 
even know that the moon is larger than it appears. Before this exchange over the 
“glorious luminary of the heavens,” Arabella has again revealed her quixotic nature. 
Rather than accepting that Miss Groves—her disreputable neighbor—retreated to the 
country to avoid a scandalous pregnancy, Arabella concocts a romantic and ridiculous 
scenario in which Miss Groves’ reputation is spared. Miss Glanville, whose time in 
London grants her a fuller experience of the affairs between men and women, discerns 
that Arabella’s notions are incorrect. Taking great pleasure in elucidating this folly, Miss 
Glanville compares Arabella’s romantic idea of Miss Groves to arguing that the “moon is 
made of cream cheese” (Lennox 142). Redeeming Arabella’s obvious misperception of 
Miss Groves, Lennox again unveils Arabella’s superior knowledge from behind the 
obscuring curtain of quixotism:  
I have taken some pains to contemplate the Heavenly Bodies; and, by Reading 
and Observation, am able to comprehend some Part of their Excellence: Therefore 
it is not probable I should descend to such trivial Comparisons; and liken a Planet, 
which, haply, is not much less than our earth, to a thing so inconsiderable as that 
you name—. (142) 
Notice here that Arabella’s deductions concerning the moon derive from a combination 
of literary education and empirical observation; Arabella, isolated or not, has equal 
opportunity to observe the “planet” and compare those perceptions to written descriptions 
of the moon (142). This analysis by Arabella exemplifies Locke’s ideals because it is a 
collaboration between reader, text, and reality. In this instance, Arabella exemplifies the 
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“true Key” of moral learning because she supplements her reading with observable 
evidence and measures each against the other, demonstrating that when given the tools, 
she can read rationally and navigate the maze of “variety of opinions” (Locke, Conduct 
193). 
Miss Glanville, on the other hand, is so obtuse that she continues to rail against 
her   cousin even when Arabella’s information is validated by both education and 
experience, revealing the inadequacy of both Miss Glanville’s education and her ability 
to reason effectively:   
Pardon me, dear cousin, interrupted Miss Glanville, laughing louder than before, 
if I divert myself a little with the Extravagance of your Notions…you say, that 
same moon, which don't appear broader than your Gardener's Face, is not much 
less than the whole World. Why, certainly, I have more Reason to trust my own 
Eyes than such whimsical Notions as these. (Lennox 143) 
Miss Glanville, who blunders through life relying solely on her flawed perceptions and 
ornamental learning, cannot acknowledge the validity of Arabella’s claims even when 
they are true. Here, Lennox illustrates that “Miss Glanville and the women she 
epitomizes…are incapable of thinking or acting outside the very narrow sphere of activity 
with which they have been taught to concern themselves (Palo 225). Through negative 
exemplification, Lennox argues that, as Locke himself believed, “It helps not our 
ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none”; instead, women like Miss 
Glanville need to substantiate and compare their thoughts against literary learning to gain 
“Truth and Certainty”—just as Arabella accomplishes when she is not constricted by 
society’s social constructs (Locke, Essay 2.13.18).   
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Throughout the text, it is clear that in the hierarchy of female learning, Lennox 
ranks Arabella’s literary self-education above Miss Glanville’s purely experience-based 
knowledge; however, both methods—isolated reading and pure experience— are proven 
incomplete and ultimately ineffective because they weaken women, leaving them 
susceptible to the dominant culture. This is perhaps most clearly expressed through both 
characters’ flawed perceptions of Sir George. As the prototypical rake, Sir George serves 
to reveal and exploit the female vulnerability engendered by traditionally ornamental 
education. Upon entering into Arabella’s and Miss Glanville’s society, Sir George makes 
plain his agenda for both women. For Arabella, he plans “the Means he should use to 
acquire the Esteem of Lady Bella, of whose Person he was a little enamored, but of her 
Fortune a great deal more” (Lennox 129). After witnessing Arabella’s “particular Turn,” 
Sir George sets out to use his knowledge of French romances to “serve himself with her 
Foible, to effect his Designs” (129-30). In regard to Miss Glanville, Sir George finds that 
“It be necessary, in order to [foster] his better Acquaintance with Arabella, to be upon 
very friendly Terms with” her; resultingly, Sir George manipulates Miss Glanville’s weak 
moral character and coquettish ways. He resolves to say “a thousand gallant things” to 
keep her enamored with him and, therefore, further his goal with Arabella (130). Sir 
George is experienced in society, rakish, handsome, and well spoken; thus, Miss 
Glanville is easily swept away by his charms because her experience-based education 
leaves her ill-equipped to resist them. Both women’s imperfect understanding of Sir 
George’s true intentions reveals that their respective educations both fail to fulfill 
Locke’s model for moral erudition, further driving home the need for a healthy balance of 
experience and literary learning. 
71 
 
Lennox’s premise is further confirmed through the ease with which Sir George 
manipulates even Arabella, the woman who charmed Mr. Glanville “to the last Degree of 
Admiration” with her “Wit, and her fine Reasoning upon every Subject proposed” 
(Lennox 46). As an integral component of his ruse, Sir George speaks to Arabella in the 
cadence of a romantic hero and finds common ground in the adventures of romantic 
characters. Despite her quixotic leanings, Arabella remains the “consummate empirical 
observer,” consistently using patterns found in her “histories” to support her own 
judgements (Hall 90). Sir George, however, is equipped with the same examples, which 
he uses to circumvent Arabella’s fine reasoning abilities. Because Arabella is 
intellectually accomplished but deficient in worldly knowledge, she reasons well—
utilizing multiple exemplars to substantiate her assumptions—but fails to deduce 
empirically. As Elaine Kauver notes, “When Arabella is made aware that Sir George also 
reads romances” his opinions are authenticated in Arabella’s mind because he 
communicates in her distinct language (217). Therefore, precisely because Arabella is not 
familiar with social realities, Sir George is able to wield the exact type of knowledge in 
which she is most effectively deceived. When she speaks to Sir George and Miss 
Glanville of Miss Groves’ scandalous retreat into the country, for instance, Arabella 
defends her friend by saying Miss Groves was married to her love and thus she broke no 
rules of decorum—a notion that the reader, Miss Glanville, and Sir George all know is 
incorrect. Despite the delusion of her ideas, Arabella defends Miss Groves’ actions with 
numerous examples from her readings—just as Locke advises: Cleopatra and Julius 
Caesar faced similar persecution over their marriage and Artemisa and Alexander were 
suspect when they ran away together. Not only does Arabella use demonstrative 
examples to validate her opinions, but she also values other people’s opinions as further 
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substantiation. When Sir George asserts his feigned agreement, Arabella says, “I am very 
glad…that having always had some Inclination to excuse, and even defend, the Flight of 
Artemisa and Alexander, my Opinion is warranted by that of a Person so generous as 
yourself” (143). Reminiscent of her conversation about the moon, Arabella endeavors to 
reflect on her reading, compare it to observable life, and even validate it through 
conversation with others. However, in this instance, Arabella does not have the requisite 
experience to fall back on and, consequently, cannot reach accurate conclusions. Thus, 
Arabella attempts to live by Locke’s principles—juxtaposing her learning against others’ 
opinions and experiences of the world—yet her attempts are unsuccessful because of her 
isolation and inadequate education; as a result, Arabella is manipulated by Sir George and 
rendered weak by her unwise, gendered learning.   
  However, it is not only isolated reading that leaves women open to manipulation 
by the dominant discourse but unbridled experience as well; Miss Glanville, the foil to 
Arabella, falls for Sir George’s tricks just as readily as does Arabella. Of course, the 
romantic speeches that work to convince Arabella run counter to Sir George’s agenda 
with Miss Glanville; thus, he is forced to control Miss Glanville’s particular 
weaknesses—vanity and coquetry—in the same manner that he employs Arabella’s 
quixotism against her. To keep both women content and ignorant of his true intentions, 
Sir George encourages Miss Glanville to perceive any discussions she hears “in this 
[romantic] strain” as his “ridiculing her cousin's fantastical turn” (Lennox 139). Because 
of Miss Glanville’s near total ignorance, Sir George is not fearful that Miss Glanville 
might recognize his insincerity because “the gay coquette…assisted him to deceive her” 
(139). Sir George, knowing what best flatters Miss Glanville’s vanity, speaks 
disparagingly of Arabella in her presence and then romances her when Arabella retreats. 
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As a result of her absolute confidence in Sir George’s counterfeited interest in her, Miss 
Glanville is “certain that Sir George is not in love with” Arabella and compromises her 
reputation in pursuit of his continued affections (192). Miss Glanville, with her 
experience-based, unread, and ornamental education, is not able to, as Locke says, gain 
the “principle of all virtue and excellency” because she does not deny herself “the 
satisfaction of [her] own desires where reason does not authorize them”; this, of course, is 
a byproduct of her inferior education (Conduct 29). Instead, she places her immediate 
desire for conquest above prolonged happiness and morality. And, resultingly, as will be 
seen in the final section of this chapter, her prospects become just as stifled as her 
education.     
Careful juxtaposition of Arabella’s and Miss Glanville’s education—and their 
resulting natures—further reveals Lennox’s educational argument: If the human mind is a 
tabula rasa, then men and women alike require a careful and diversified education that 
balances book-learning with experienced-based knowledge for the purpose of preparing 
the individual to gain “moral autonomy and self-realization” (Porter 256). As Locke 
argues, nine out of ten men, or in this instance women, are “Good or Evil, useful or not, 
by their Education” (STCE 2). Through the characters of Arabella and Miss Glanville, 
Lennox decisively establishes that an isolated literary education leads to valid learning 
but also to an incomplete understanding of the unknown world. In contrast, a purely 
ornamental and experience-based education, without reading to grant stability, is the 
catalyst for immorality and still does not grant a true understanding of the world. If 
Locke’s schema of learning—as expressed in his Essay and STCE— argues for the 
strategic molding of a child’s mind to promote his or her growth into a rational, moral, 
and socially responsible adult, then Lennox’s The Female Quixote deliberately shows that 
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neither form of female learning, a restricted or an ornamental education, fulfills Locke’s 
model.  
 
Harmony Achieved: Arabella’s Lockean Rehabilitation  
 Lennox’s penultimate and self-proclaimed “Best Chapter in the History” is much 
debated in scholarship because of the questions that surround its authorship and is “anti-
feminist conclusion”; however, these two emphases shift the focus away from Arabella’s 
Lockean rehabilitation and the implications that her transformation has for Lennox 
argument for women’s education.17 In this chapter, as Anna Uddén’s article on “Quixotic 
Hermeneutics” in The Female Quixote notes, Lennox “embeds the arch-critic of [her] 
day, Samuel Johnson, turning his fictional counterpart into the instrument of the Quixotic 
reform” (451). However, Uddén’s article fails to mention that, as previously 
demonstrated by Hedrick, Johnson closely identified with Locke’s theories, particularly 
those with moral implications. Because Johnson was Lennox’s mentor and close 
correspondent, his absorption of Locke was similarly taken up by Lennox herself when 
she depicts Arabella’s rehabilitation; this is most evident in the “good Divine” doctor’s 
methodology, both characters’ Lockean dialogue, and the empirical nature of their 
conversation. Importantly, giving proper emphasis to Locke’s presence within Arabella’s 
rehabilitation unveils Lennox’s liberal argument for equitable education and, further, this 
focus can “account for Arabella's con-version [sic] without conceding a feminist defeat” 
(Motooka 252).  
 Though there are a multitude of circumstances that propel Arabella towards 
accepting reality, three of these factors explicitly contribute to Lennox’s educational 
                                                             
17 Motooka speaks to the anti-feminist ending of Quixote but does not relate it to Locke’s ideas.  
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argument: Mr. Glanville’s desire to grant Arabella experience, Sir George’s inability to 
control the romance he constructs, and Arabella’s own request for a “worthy Divine” 
(Lennox 366). First, as Locke’s authoritative theories suggest, before Arabella can 
undergo her re-education, she must gain experiential knowledge of the world. To this 
aim, after the Marquis’s death and numerous romantic “adventures,” Mr. Glanville moves 
to correct the only fault he perceives in Arabella’s character, quixotism; reminiscent of 
Locke, Mr. Glanville proposes experience as the best antidote to Arabella’s folly. 
Because “Mr. Glanville…thought the Solitude [Arabella] lived in, confirmed her in her 
absurd and ridiculous Notions,” he poses time spent in London as the remedy (Lennox 
254). Importantly, with the death of the Marquis, representative of patriarchal society, 
and the movement to Mr. Glanville, a more forward-thinking man, Lennox renders a shift 
between dominant and emergent ideologies. In London, Arabella will gain a greater 
understanding of the world and, as Mr. Glanville hopes, this will dissuade her from her 
more outlandish ideas; this decision, of course, proves advantageous because it is in 
London that Arabella regains her full capacity for reason.  
Furthermore, at the same moment that Arabella advances to this new experiential 
knowledge, Sir George further spurs Arabella’s re-education with his romantic fictions. 
As his fabrication grows more elaborate, Laurie Lanbauer argues that “Sir George, who 
makes such confident claims about romance, certainly can neither regulate nor restrain it” 
(31). In his efforts to win Arabella through the defamation of Mr. Glanville, Sir George 
concocts a romantic plot in which Mr. Glanville is dishonored and, thus, is unsuitable for 
Arabella; However, as Lanbauer notes, Sir George cannot control this fiction and the 
series of events that are set into motion by Sir George’s lies directly lead to Arabella’s 
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rehabilitation. Thus, the improper reading of a male character is a catalyst for Arabella’s 
reformation.  
Finally, it is Arabella herself who contributes the last spark needed to truly 
destroy her quixotic ideas. At the conclusion of the book Arabella throws herself into the 
River Thames to avoid fictionalized captors and, resultingly, falls ill. In fear for her life, 
Arabella desires a “Pious and Learned Doctor” to work on both her mind and her body; 
this doctor—who uncoincidentally is both a physician and a philosopher like Locke 
himself— is the “Cure” for Arabella. In their subsequent philosophical conversations, the 
methodology that the Doctor employs, his opinions of reading, and the empirical model 
utilized in their discussion all highlight Locke’s prominence in Lennox’s educational 
argument. When proper attention is given to a balanced feminine education—one which, 
as will be seen, Lennox herself creates—Lennox argues that social harmony is achieved, 
and woman is actualized or emerged.   
 Throughout her penultimate chapter, Lennox employs multiple tiers of Lockean 
ideas, creating a complex tapestry of female learning that, from its very foundation, is in 
conversation with Locke; at the base of this didactic analysis is the doctor’s use of 
Locke’s methodology to achieve Arabella’s renascence. In Locke’s model of education, 
as expressed in STCE, he argues that when raising children the parent should contemplate 
“first the Health of the Body” because bodily health is “necessary…to our business and 
happiness” (STCE 10). In her re-education of Arabella, Lennox echoes this same balance 
of corporeal and intellectual concerns. Before initiating his didactic tête-à-tête with 
Arabella, the Doctor ensures the wellbeing of Arabella’s body before progressing to her 
mind, an act that is fundamental to Locke’s STCE. However, he “no sooner perciev’d that 
the Health of her Body was almost restor’d…that [the Doctor] introduc’d the Subject” of 
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curing her mind (Lennox 368). Foundational to Locke’s Essay and to Lennox’s argument, 
she also employs Locke’s tabula rasa in restoring her heroine to full reason. As 
previously outlined, Locke argues in his Essay that the mind is “white paper, void of all 
characters, without any ideas” and it is through “observation…of our minds perceived 
and reflected on by ourselves…which supplies our understandings” (Essay 2.1.2). This 
same principle—that the sensations and perceptions that constitute experience are the 
fundamental to our understandings—is appreciable from the genesis of the Doctor’s and 
Arabella’s conversation, and, importantly, it is this empirical model that facilitates 
Arabella’s re-education. For instance, the Doctor explains to Arabella that  
[t]he Apprehensions of any future Evil, Madam, said the Divine…must always 
arise from Comparison. We can judge of the Future only by the Past, and have 
therefore only Reason to fear or suspect, when we see the same Causes in Motion 
which have formerly produc’d Mischief. (Lennox 372)  
In essence, the Doctor distinctively mirrors Locke’s notion that all concepts are formed 
from experience; these ideas—whether they are the fear of abduction or the notion of 
proper courtship—are the due results of past sensations and perceptions. Thus, the Doctor 
employs the empirical model and Locke’s theory of the mind to illustrate didactically the 
flaws in Arabella’s perception of the world.   
 The parallels between Lennox’s instructive chapter and Locke’s authoritative 
theories are further established by the Doctor and Arabella’s discussion of reading itself; 
in this exchange, the Doctor’s concept of proper reading closely mirrors Locke’s advice 
as evinced in STCE and Conduct. To review, Locke argues that those who read 
assiduously do not by this act unquestionably gain knowledge because proper reading is a 
continuous dialogue between text, reader, and reality; only by constant comparison of 
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read experiences with lived ones can a reader access “truth.” Arabella enthusiastically 
contemplates what she reads, constantly making observations upon her nook-learning in 
an attempt to process it in a Lockean manner, but she goes astray because of the perfectly 
useless material with which she is supplied. When the Doctor analyzes Arabella’s use of 
read-exemplars as the foundation of her flawed understanding, he enumerates that,“[t]he 
Power of Prognostication, may, by Reading and Conversation, be extended beyond our 
own Knowledge: And the great Use of Books, is that of participating without Labour or 
Hazard the Experience of others”; however, when “senseless Fictions”  are used as 
foundational knowledge, it “pervert[s] the Understanding” (Lennox 372, 374). Thus, 
understanding of the world derives not only from one’s own knowledge but also from 
measuring and judging others’ experiences; this is true whether these experiences are 
absorbed from acquaintances or literary characters. However, the Doctor argues that the 
“Authority of Scribblers” begs questioning—just as, according to Locke, the validity of 
social custom requires scrutiny. Similar to Locke, Lennox’s doctor argues that through 
reading an individual gains experiences, which provide the mind with the “instruments of 
knowledge,” but to make reading useful, the proper material and the proper method must 
both be employed.  
Even the demonstrative texts that Lennox’s doctor suggests as exemplary reading 
further link Lennox’s educational arguments to Locke’s work. According to the Doctor, 
Arabella’s problem lies not with her fine reasoning abilities but with her choice of 
reading material. Instead of romance, the Doctor recommends “The Fables of Æsop” as 
moral reading and also recommends the “solid Instructions” of Richardson—who, 
intriguingly, specifically uses Locke’s STCE in his famous Pamela (Lennox 377). It is 
not coincidence that in his STCE Locke specifically suggests that to prevent filling the 
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mind “with perfectly useless trumpery …Aesop's Fables [are] the best” for a child (116). 
Therefore, not only does Lennox model her concept of proper reading upon Locke’s 
ideas, but her “good doctor” recommends the very same reading material to stave off 
vice.  
Finally, and arguably most significantly, the empirical dialogue employed by both 
the doctor and Arabella closely mirrors the theories found within Locke’s work and 
solidifies Lennox’s educational argument. This protracted and didactic exchange contains 
a multitude of examples that express the essential Lockean nature of Arabella’s 
rehabilitation; however, three exemplars—Arabella’s reciprocation of the doctor’s 
empirical questioning, her refusal to accept custom as unquestionable fact, and the 
emphatic advocation of experience as the great teacher —will sufficiently evince the 
similarities. To begin, the doctor asks of Arabella, “How is any oral, or written 
Testimony, confuted or confirmed?” (377). Rather than telling Arabella how knowledge 
is determined true, reminiscent of STCE, the doctor creates a moral lesson, not a moment 
of condemnation. In response, Arabella correctly answers, “By comparing it…with the 
Testimony of others, or with the natural Effects and standing Evidence of the Facts 
related, and sometimes by comparing it with itself” (378). This participatory learning, wh 
depends on the successful comparison and analyzation of information, is precisely what 
Locke suggests. Continuing the empirical model, the doctor asks, “If then your Ladyship 
will abide by this last…You will perceive that your Authors have parceled out the World 
at Discretion” (378). After the Doctor carefully questions the accuracy and legitimacy of 
the “French Wits” from whom Arabella gains her knowledge of subjects like ancient 
history, Arabella is forced to admit, based upon empiricism, that she is unable to validate 
her notions with factual evidence (375).  
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However, she does not accept this knowledge, even from an authoritative figure 
like “the good Divine” doctor, without logically and systematically questioning it to 
prevent—as Locke mandates—the wholesale adoption of social custom; this furthers 
Lennox’s argument that the dominant discourse cannot be accepted wholesale. After 
conditionally accepting that her French romances are not historical, she then asks the 
doctor why “supposing them Fictions, and intended to be received as Fictions, you 
censure them as absurd?” (378). For Arabella, and for Lennox as well, identifying 
something as fiction does not strip it of moral value, as arguments of The Female Quixote 
evince; logically, therefore, the doctor must next denote romantic knowledge as absurd in 
order to signify it as improper reading material. In so doing, he brings back to center 
Locke’s emphasis on experience, furthering Lennox’s argument that women, too, require 
experience balanced with education. When asking “whether Life is truly described in 
those Books,” the doctor explains that “the Likeness of a Picture can only be determined 
by a Knowledge of the Original” (379). Therefore, the problem with French romances is 
not the fictionality but the absurdity of the problems they address; “[e]very Page of these 
Volumes is filled with such extravagance” that they cannot represent the problems of life 
(380). However, the most damning circumstance of Arabella’s reading is not the material 
but her lack of experience—after all, outlandish fictions can be “imbued with political 
implications” (C. Johnson 32). As the doctor says to Arabella, “You have yet had little 
Opportunity of knowing the Ways of Mankind, which cannot be learned but from 
experience, and of which the highest Understanding, and the lowest, must enter the world 
in equal Ignorance” (Lennox 379). Two significant points are present in this statement; 
first, as Lennox systematically argues throughout Quixote, experience of the world is 
essential in discerning where true and false knowledge diverge. Second, both the 
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“highest” and “lowest” understandings enter the world as a tabula rasa—whether male or 
female—therefore, no matter the sex the education should be the same. Throughout The 
Female Quixote, it is made clear that only a combination of education, read-learning, and 
experience, all geared towards the attainment of morality, will result in a fully actualized 
and virtuous individual, capable of subverting the dominant discourse. 
With Arabella’s recovery of “the free Use of all her noble Powers of Reason,” so 
too are the benefits of a moral, literary, and experience-based education fully realized 
(Lennox 382). Although Arabella is embarrassed and, thus, reflects often on the ridicule 
“to which she now saw plainly she had exposed herself,” she also attains a more 
prosperous end than her counterpart Miss Glanville or the pretender Sir George (383). Sir 
George, “entangled in his own Artifices,” marries Miss Glanville out of “Necessity,” 
which, the narrator notes, is a “Fit of Penitence” for his crimes. The union between Miss 
Glanville and Sir George, which occurs on the same day as Arabella’s and Mr. 
Glanville’s, is only a marriage in the “common Acceptance of the Word” (383). Thus, 
Miss Glanville, with her ornamental and vice-ridden education, receives the natural 
consequence of gendered learning, a marriage grounded in patriarchal constructs; 
however, Arabella receives a different end. After she realizes the unreality of her notions 
of courtship, she tells Mr. Glanville that she is “happy to be desired for a Partner for Life 
by a Man of [his] Sense and Honour” (Lennox 383). Some see this quick abandonment of 
her powerful romantic notions as the giving over of her authority to the hegemonic 
construct of marriage; however, if Lennox is in conversation with Locke, then marriage 
does not necessitate loss of power. Mary L. Shanley, in her survey of marriage contracts, 
notes that Locke prepossess that marriage is entered into voluntarily by both partners and, 
radically, that it can be dissevered as well. Further, “Locke explicitly rejected the notion 
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that marriage requires absolute sovereignty in the husband,” granting male authority only 
in disagreements between husband and wife over common interests such as children and 
property (Shanley 88-9). Therefore, according to Locke’s “individualistic premises,” 
Arabella maintains control over her “self” within a marriage that combines “Virtue and 
laudable Affection of the Mind” (Shanley 91, Lennox 383). Therefore, if Lennox’s 
appropriation of Locke’s ideas is accepted, then Arabella’s union with Mr. Glanville is 
not the submission of romantic woman to rational man but the culmination of Arabella's 
Lockean education. In other words, by combining Locke’s notion of proper reading with 
Arabella’s empirical mind and a—albeit belated— rational education, Lennox 
demonstrates that this balanced learning allows woman to reach self-actualization. 
Further, the dominant ideology, as embodied by the Marquis, can be overcome by more 
moderate and emerging notions like those personified by Mr. Glanville.   
Finally, bringing her social commentary out of the realm of fiction and into 
eighteenth-century women’s lives, Lennox devises and creates her own solution to the 
issue of unbalanced female education: her learning-centered periodical the Lady’s 
Museum. As Lennox demonstrates through her quixotic heroine, there is reality in 
romance hidden alongside the lies, just as there are false constructs buried within the 
“truth” of society’s customs. As long as readers, of both life and books, analyze and 
question the information presented to them, as Locke promotes, they will gain moral 
learning through their reading, no matter the material. However, the question remains: 
from where will moral and reasonable women gain the requisite tools to analyze what 
they read in both literature as well as in life? Further, and most critical to a woman’s 
successful “reading,” how will the buttress of experience enter the highly restricted 
domestic sphere? This “quandary,” pondered through The Female Quixote and the 
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character of Arabella, results in Lennox’s creation of the Lady’s Museum, a highly 
diversified periodical that may “contribute a solution” (Sagal 146). In the Lady’s 
Museum, Lennox incorporates fiction, geography, philosophy, educational treatises—
which uncoincidentally mirror Lockean ideas—history, and essays that participate in 
cultural discourse. As Sagal expresses in her article on Lennox’s Museum, the periodical 
can “be read as an endorsement not only of women’s scientific study, but also of 
women’s self-directed education as a means for personal fulfilment” (145). Thus, the 
fictional Lockean experiment of Arabella—through which Lennox questioned 
traditionally gendered education and considered a possible solution—results in a literary 
tool that real women could use to further their own self-education. Due to its varied 
nature, it is clear that the solution hit upon in The Female Quixote, that women required a 
diversified education of reading coupled with experience, is implemented by Lennox in 
the Lady’s Museum. Cementing her contributions to eighteenth-century women’s 
education, Lennox utilizes two male dominated traditions, the quixotic novel and the 
periodical form, to both create a viable model for female self-education and to furnish 





A Hierarchy of Feminine Readers: Educating the Quixote and “Writing” the 
Authentic Woman  
It was not particularly surprising that these same massive disruptions—defeat in 
America, revolution in France and an unprecedented rate of economic and social 
change in Britain itself—should also have provoked a restatement of the 
differences between the sexes and of the need for female subordination…in 
Britain the boundaries supposedly separating men and women were, in fact, 
unstable and becoming more so. At one and the same time, separate sexual 
spheres were being increasingly prescribed in theory, yet increasingly broken 
through practice.   
Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the 
              Nation 1707-1837, 1992 
A relish for reading…should be cultivated very early in life; and those who reflect 
can tell, of what importance it is for the mind to have some resources in itself, and 
not to be entirely dependent on the senses for employment and amusement… 
Reading is the most rational employment, if people seek food for the 
understanding, and do not read merely to remember words, or with a view to 
quote celebrated authors, and retail sentiments they do not understand or feel. 
Judicious books enlarge the mind…Those productions which give a wrong 
account of the human passions, and the various accidents in life, ought not to be 
read before the judgment is formed, or at least exercised.    
     Mary Wollstonecraft, Thoughts on the 
            Education of Daughters, 1787 
  
Completed in 1799,18 Jane Austen’s earliest novel Northanger Abbey has been 
criticized for the juvenile nature of its composition and its lack of overall coherence; 
however, upon closer study, we find that Austen’s novel, like Lennox’s Quixote, engages 
the complex and multilayered social discourse on women’s reading and learning. Early 
critics, like Anne Ehrenpreis and Alan McKillop, disregard Austen’s intentional use of 
                                                             
18 According to Claire Tomalin’s Jane Austen: A Life, Northanger Abbey was written between 1798 and 
1799. Once completed, Austen periodically revisited it until she submitted it for publication in 1803; 
however, the publisher failed to follow through with printing and, consequently, it was not officially 
published until after her death in 1818 (92, 122-23, 184, and 275).  
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the Quixotic form and instead argue that the abrupt alteration of Catherine Morland from 
her entrance into Bath in Volume I to her Gothic delusions of Volume II creates a 
discrepancy in character that cannot be unified. If we read Northanger Abbey not as a 
realistic novel but as a critique of women’s reading and women’s education, however, 
truth to character is not fundamental to Northanger Abbey, as it is in other works by 
Austen. Indeed, the focus by earlier critics on the inconsistencies of character and form 
has been challenged by more recent arguments that downplay such inconsistencies in 
order to acknowledge the political maturity of such an early work. As a result, Austen’s 
didactic use of the quixotic paradigm—as is established by Elaine M. Kauver and Jodi L. 
Wyatt—as well as its political and social implications, has become significant. The shift 
in the critical debate surrounding Northanger Abbey towards feminist issues lays the 
foundation for a careful look at the ingrained societal dilemmas of female education—
education which is dominated by male ideology and disallows “true” feminine reading or 
the obtainment of agency. In “Jane Austen and Female Reading,” for instance, Robert 
Uphaus delineates the political representation of reading in Austen’s novels, including 
Northanger Abbey, illustrating Austen’s contribution to the cultural debate of women’s 
literacy. However, his extensive survey of Austen merely employs brief examples from 
Northanger. As it could be argued that “[n]owhere in Austen… are reading and its social 
consequences more central than [in] Northanger Abbey,” a brief foray into Catherine 
Morland’s reading cannot uncover sufficiently the sophistication of Austen’s argument 
(Benedict 1). Rather, close analysis of reading within the text reveals not only that Austen 
functions within the same moral paradigm as Lennox but also that she develops the 
educational model that Lennox began in The Female Quixote.  
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As established in the preceding chapters, during the long eighteenth century, John 
Locke’s liberal and universal principles were pervasive and, therefore, were engaged by 
female educationalists like Lennox; in surveying Austen’s own education and reading, it 
is clear that she, at the very least, draws inspiration from both Locke’s and Lennox’s 
work. The ideological imprints that both authors leave upon her novels begin with 
Austen’s avid early reading. Other than a short yet unproductive stay at boarding school, 
Austen, like Lennox’s Arabella, was educated primarily through reading in her father’s 
library (Tomalin 41-5). Her father was a “profound scholar” who, as her brother implies 
in Austen’s obituary, cultivated her passion for literature (Austen 191).  As a result, 
“[h]er reading was extensive in history and belles lettres” and also included canonical 
authors such as “Shakespeare, Milton, Chaucer, Richardson, Thomson,” and, paramount 
for this study, “Locke” himself (191, Pearson 143). Solidifying her connection to Locke, 
Austen’s favorite moral writer was none other than Samuel Johnson who, as previously 
established, was a devoted proponent of Locke’s ideas and incorporated them into much 
of his writing, including The Rambler, which Austen read (Tomalin 41). Thus, it is 
apparent that Austen was familiar both with Locke and with authors directly influenced 
by Locke, notably her “dear Dr. Johnson”; therefore, a linear progression of influence can 
be established between Austen and Locke’s authoritative principles (Letters 126). 
Further, the same is true for her relationship with The Female Quixote. In a letter to her 
sister Cassandra, Austen speaks to her reading of Lennox:   
‘Alphonsine’ did not do. We were disgusted in twenty pages, as, independent of a 
bad translation, it has indelicacies which disgrace a pen hitherto so pure; and we 
changed it for the ‘Female Quixote’, which now makes our evening amusement; 
to me a very high one, as I find the work quite equal to what I remembered it. 
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Mrs. F.A., to whom it is new, enjoys it as one could wish; the other Mary, I 
believe, has little pleasure from that or any other book. (Austen, Letters 120)  
Here Austen establishes several points of significance: First, she read The Female 
Quixote not once but several times, and when she returns to its familiar plot in 1807, it 
still resonates with her. Second, she categorizes her female companions according to their 
proclivity for reading; Mrs. F.A. partakes in their participatory reading “as one could 
wish” while Mary, reminiscent of Miss Glanville, does not derive pleasure from books at 
all. As this chapter will demonstrate, Austen (intentionally or not) uses Locke’s model of 
reading to create a hierarchy of female readers; at the pinnacle of this hierarchy is 
Catherine, a quixotic character, who uses both book-learning and experience to 
conceptualize a better understanding of herself. As a result, situating Northanger Abbey 
in Locke’s theories and comparing it with Lennox’s Quixote reveals the educational 
implications latent within Austen’s text.  
Although Austen’s novels are frequently placed within the Bildungsroman 
genre—which by its definition “denotes growth, formation, or education” (Barney 174)— 
there exists little scholarship in which Austen’s advocacy of female learning is 
emphasized; however, through Northanger Abbey, Austen creates an educational 
argument that is in conversation with educational authors of the past, namely Lennox and 
Locke. During the late eighteenth century, the sign of the educated woman could signify 
anything from the “national superiority” of Britain to the radicalism of a failing empire 
(Guest 101). As Raymond Williams argues, when “emergent” ideologies become a threat 
to the “dominant” ideology, the “dominant” culture “reaches [its hand] much further than 
ever before… [into] areas of experience and practice and meaning” in an attempt to 
restrain the “emergent” and, thus, cement its continued authority (125). In the wake of 
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rebellion and revolution—when Britain’s dominant discourse feared the strength of the 
emergent ideology of female equality—these discordant ideals forced the reading woman 
into a liminal space, at once a signal of progress and symbol of corruption. Consequently, 
creating “fictions of dissent” during this era, as Austen did, was a precarious undertaking; 
however, through the use of Lennox’s quixotic model and Locke’s liberal principles, 
Austen generates an argument for a proper form of reading that debunks feminine myths 
and allows for true intellectual enlightenment to overcome the deficient nature of 
domestic education (Miller 316). Further, using Locke’s theories as a guide, Austen 
creates a hierarchy of feminine readers to elucidate the inherent deficiencies of gendered 
reading that is founded in male-centric ideology and to demonstrate how true learning 
stems from a balance of both education and experience; further, when this proper 
education is achieved, as Catherine Morland demsontrates, social harmony is realized and 
the learned woman is empowered to create a sense of self that is fully emerged, 
independent of the dominant discourse.  
Contextualizing Austen’s Quixote: The “Dominant” and “Emergent” Ideologies    
Before analyzing the subversive nature of Austen’s commentary on female 
literacy, she must first be contextualized within the shifting cultural debates present in the 
latter half of the eighteenth century. Before revolution struck in both America and 
France, as Colley contends, “the true position of British women was more diverse than 
the statute books suggested, and increasingly in flux” (244). In at least partial reaction to 
both the universal principles of mind, as expressed by Locke, and the emergence of 
respected, publishing, and public women, like Lennox, the carefully demarcated, 
restricted role of the British woman was more varied than in decades past. This is not to 
say that the dominant discourse placed women on equal footing with men but to note that 
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as the common man advocated for male suffrage, a voice in the political process, and 
more equitable opportunities, the role of woman—perhaps a consequence undesired—
became more malleable (Colley 243-44). Thus, to prevent women’s emergence as 
autonomous beings, sexual differences were reiterated with renewed vigor. This 
strengthening of gendered binaries is perhaps most apparent, and insistent, in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s Emile. Both to promote “universal” male rights and to preclude the 
same advancement for women, Rousseau delineates the differences between species and 
sex, creating a dichotomous view of gender that solidified women’s inferiority, signifying 
it as “natural.” In so doing he argues that “the only thing we know with certainty is that 
everything man and woman have in common belongs to the species, and that everything 
which distinguishes them belongs to the sex” (Rousseau 358). With his “dazzlingly 
successful” treatise, Rousseau formulated a methodical framework by which such sexual 
politics as he promoted were not only validated but also represented as integral to 
maintaining the natural order (Colley 244). According to Rousseau, biological and 
natural traits of both sexes verify that “One [man] ought to be active and strong, the other 
[woman] passive and weak. One must necessarily will and be able; it suffices that the 
other put up little resistance” (358). Thus, women’s advancement into the public sphere, 
particularly in regard to education, was again stunted by constricting social customs as 
exemplified but by no means limited to Rousseau.  
With revolution in both America and France, British society’s adverse response to 
new ideologies intensified, especially when contemplating women’s possible egress from 
the private sphere; consequently, the very lexicon of individualism, as enshrined in 
Locke’s authoritative writings, became subversive. As Claudia Johnson explains in Jane 
Austen: Women, Politics, and the Novel, “Before the French Revolution Lockean ideas 
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about happiness, education, judgment, autonomous choice, and the limited though 
necessary role of authority enjoyed general currency”; however, as more and more 
individuals heralded reform, “conservative observers” saw the individualistic and 
inclusive language of such men as Locke as a threat to the status quo: The very lexicon of 
equality was considered dangerously dissident by many (xxi-xxii). Where once 
conventional words like “reason, judgement, liberty, imperiality, happiness, and 
independence” were essential to the fabric of discourse, they were now infused with 
radical, political potential. Therefore, as recalcitrant women like Mary Wollstonecraft 
employed this “radical” vocabulary to advocate for a female education that promoted 
“fully rational and self-responsible citizens,” they were labeled as “unsex’d women,” as 
adversaries of the social welfare (Guest 162). In reading Wollstonecraft’s, A Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman, Claudia Johnson notes that during this time 
conservative audiences were shocked to realize that if women were indeed 
educated and permitted to act like ‘rational creatures,’ they might consider 
themselves entitled, as free agents, to frame their own desires and pursue 
happiness on their own terms, rather than be content as dutiful daughters or 
submissive wives. (15)  
Wollstonecraft’s participation in the intellectual and public spheres, as well as the 
aggression with which society censured her for this transgression, is representative of the 
treatment that forward-thinking women received in the late eighteenth century.19 Coming 
of age in this polemical society, Austen, by necessity, carefully chose how best to voice 
her dissent. In Northanger Abbey, Austen presents the powerful potential that women’s 
                                                             
19 According to Harriet Guest, variances of this same opinion were held for Anna Laetitia Barbauld, Mary 
Hays, Mary Robinson, Charlotte Smith, and Helen Maria Williams, all of whom were linked to 
Wollstonecraft’s particular brand of “monstrous woman.” 
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literary education holds for both restoring social harmony and granting women agency; 
however, as seen in previous chapters, women’s reading was not beyond scrutiny, and 
1790s politics, as exemplified by Wollstonecraft, only polarized further the diverse views 
on female learning and reading. 
As Katie Halsey aptly notes, “[A]n understanding of eighteenth-century anxieties 
over gender roles is central to an understanding of the history of education”; however, 
this argument must be pushed further because recognizing these sexual politics is also 
integral to discerning the symbiotic—and potentially subversive—relationship between 
gender roles, education, and reading (431). In recognition of this complicated and 
powerful relationship, patriarchal society sought methods of regulating both the 
education that women received and the read material that infiltrated the domestic sphere. 
In the 1780s, boarding school became referred to as a “public” education. As Michèle 
Cohen argues, “[T]his discursive shift was particularly significant because it enabled 
educationalist and moralists to claim that precisely because” school took place in the 
“public” it was unsuitable for women whose natural sphere was private (587). Hence, 
women were increasingly relegated to a domestic, home education that denied them 
access to experience. When gender roles are thus cemented, women’s primary access to 
worldly experience—whether it be notions of British society, individualistic philosophy, 
or exemplars of powerful women—stems, by necessity, from reading material. In an 
attempt to control this literary flow of information, facsimiles of literature were produced 
in quotation books that were packaged purely for “the fast and shallow acquisition of a 
wide variety of texts” so that women could mimic “feminine accomplishment” rather 
than actually being intellectually accomplished (Benedict 2). Further exemplifying this 
trend, during Austen’s maturation, there were published “a number of novels, tales, 
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poems and educational works [that] centre[d] on full-scale critical analyses of female 
reading practices” (Pearson 8). Many of these texts depicted women whose reading 
caused either quixotism or milder misperceptions of the world; this gendered 
representation of reading became “especially common from the 1790s” onward (Pearson 
8). By designating reading as potentially damming to women’s all-important reputations, 
the reading of unsavory texts—or perhaps more accurately those which challenged the 
dominant culture—was, if not halted at least, stymied. As Williams argues of culture, 
when the dominant discourse is challenged by the emerging, in this case intellectually 
independent woman, it often exerts further control over individuals’ lives in an effort to 
maintain its authority. Thus, the “ambivalent perception of [women’s education and 
reading] as a sign of progress or corruption” can best be understood as a struggle between 
dominant and emerging ideologies (Guest 86). Increased gender roles, regulation of 
information, and denial of worldly experience all work to maintain patriarchal control of 
women’s lives; however, women like Austen, following the model laid out by Lennox 
and embodying the ideas of Locke, “developed stylistic techniques which enabled them 
to use politically charged material” by covert means (C. Johnson xxi).  
Writing within such a tendentious society, female authors like Austen 
appropriated the novel as a means to voice their discontent within a politically rigid 
system that frequently served to place women “in a state of perpetual childhood, unable 
to stand alone” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 88). Consequently, female authors were torn 
between two steadfastly opposing forces: the need to publish and sell within a 
misogynistic culture and the desire to create authentic female literature. As Claudia 
Johnson notes, “Authorial self-styling is a sticky business for a woman publicly 
committed to championing female subordination” (18). However, a careful study of 
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reading in Northanger Abbey reveals that Austen utilizes Mrs. Allen, Isabella Thorpe, 
and Eleanor Tilney to create a hierarchy of female readers, illustrating the transformative 
ability that proper reading has on education. When this chain of readers is analyzed in 
conjunction with Catherine’s literary education, Austen’s argument gains traction, 
especially through the seemingly disunifying Gothic delusions of Catherine, which 
function as a quixotic education. In giving her voice to the tide of opinion concerning 
women’s learning, Austen both refashions the educational model used by Lennox and 
also echoes Locke’s ideas concerning a reading that furnishes the mind. The result is a 
model of reading that combines education, experience, and contemplation to assist 
women in forming a self that functions outside the dominant discourse. 
Austen’s Hierarchy of Female Readers: Models of (Im)Proper Learning  
For Catherine Morland, it is not a wise doctor who steps in and cures her quixotic 
misperceptions but the examples set by other women, both negative and positive, that 
guide Catherine’s maturation and allow her to enact her own rehabilitation; thus, the 
moral character of each woman, and more specifically the reading practices of each, 
invites analysis. As Catherine leaves her country home behind, venturing into and gaining 
experience from both Bath and Northanger Abbey, she is accompanied by several 
women, each of whom furthers her experiential education. From some women, like Mrs. 
Allen, all the useful knowledge that Catherine gains is by negative example; others, 
typified by Isabella Thorpe, impart vital models for Catherine’s learning but are little 
improved themselves because they lack reflection and judgement. Lastly, in the person of 
Eleanor Tilney, Catherine observes the model woman, as presented in conduct books of 
the age. This ideal woman—though moral, pleasing, accomplished, well-read, and even 
intelligent—still serves as a negative model because she fails to differentiate her “self” 
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from the dominant ideologies that she embodies. Thus, to understand the balance struck 
by Catherine’s emerging education, we must examine the individual influences of her 
literary and moral learning, namely the women in Austen’s hierarchy of reading.     
Mrs. Allen, the least fluent reader and, therefore, the base of Austen’s hierarchy, 
represents the most fundamental problem in women’s education: ignorance. Through her 
frequent visits to Bath, she is educated in the school of social expectation, where gowns, 
exterior beauties, ornamental accomplishments, and pretense rank far superior to, in 
Lennox’s phrasing, “useful knowledge” (Lennox 48). As a result, and left in a “state of 
mental vacancy,” Mrs. Allen lacks both learning and, more troublingly, any desire to gain 
substantive knowledge (McMaster 16). Despite Catherine’s feverish discussions of 
Mysteries of Udolpho, Mrs. Allen is one of the only characters, male or female, who does 
not engage in the literary discussions so prominent in the text; in fact, Mrs. Allen, much 
like Miss Glanville or Austen’s aforementioned companion Mary, never gives any book 
the slightest interest. While Catherine loses “all worldly concerns” in her reading, Mrs. 
Allen frets over “the delay of an expected dress-maker” (Austen 33-34). Throughout the 
text, Mrs. Allen often focuses her mind almost exclusively on one subject, fashion. When 
confronted with an acquaintance in the pump room, for instance, “Mrs. Thorpe talked 
chiefly of her children, and Mrs. Allen of her gowns”; thus, materialistic rather than 
intellectual concerns are central to her character (22). However, as Locke argues and as 
Austen’s diverse female characters suggest, deficiency is not innate. In Conduct, Locke 
notes that 
[w]e are born with faculties and powers capable almost of anything, such at least 
as would carry us farther than can easily be imagined: but it is only the exercise of 
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those powers which gives us ability and skill in anything, and leads us towards 
perfection. (173) 
Mrs. Allen, who exercises her “powers” not for moral or intellectual betterment but for 
corporeal concerns, is unpracticed in the conduct of understanding and, thus, is far less 
than perfect. As seen in the epigraph, Wollstonecraft supports this idea and contends that 
women’s reading, as rendered in the epigraph of this chapter, is essential. Interestingly, in 
her treatise on the education of daughters—in which she explicitly evokes Locke—she 
envisages the flawed characters of unread women like Mrs. Allen. As she argues, reading 
is essential because it allows “the mind to have some resources in itself, and not to be 
entirely dependent on the senses for employment and amusement” (Education 48). Mrs. 
Allen, entirely dependent on her own senses, is drawn to materialistic pursuits like 
fashion. As the only female character in Northanger Abbey who does not read, she is 
depicted as mindless and in complete compliance with her male-centric society; thus, 
ignorance seems a natural consequence, for Austen, of Mrs. Allen’s rejection of book-
learning in favor of more frivolous affairs.    
As Locke argues in his Essay, to prevent acceptance of false ideologies, 
individuals must question social customs and analyze them against their own experiences 
and learning; however, Mrs. Allen, with her silly obsession with fashion and lack of 
reading, unquestioningly accepts knowledge from others. As a consequence, she is 
incapable of forming her own opinions unless they are verified by Mr. Allen, the 
facilitator of her societal acquiescence. For instance, when Catherine asks her guardian 
whether it is inappropriate both to break her plans with Mrs. Tilney and to go on a 
carriage ride with the Thorpes and her brother, the firmest opinion Mrs. Allen can give is, 
“Well, my dear...suppose you go” (58). However, when Mr. Allen hears of the plans for a 
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second carriage ride, he authoritatively commandeers his wife’s ideas when he affirms, 
“It is not right...Mrs. Allen, are not you of my way of thinking?” (71). Mrs. Allen, now 
able to confirm her own thoughts through the absorption of her husband's, states, “Yes, 
very much indeed” (71).  Joanne Cordóón argues that “the more stereotypically 
‘feminine’ the woman, the less likely she is to challenge the dominant discourse and the 
rhetorical strategy recommended to women” (43). Mrs. Allen fits firmly into this 
feminine mold and, therefore, she is, like the nine out of ten men that Locke references, 
made deficient by her education. Consequently, she more closely resembles Rousseau’s 
reimagining of woman: “A woman’s reason is practical…but not at finding that end 
itself…[rather] the woman learns from the man what must be seen” (377). Without 
proper learning, Mrs. Allen is unable to differentiate her “self” from the views of her 
husband or the silly fancies that society has assigned women; therefore, she accepts the 
dominant discourse without question. Austen’s other female characters, who all read to 
some extent, can only be a step forward from Mrs. Allen’s obliging feminine example.   
As Austen’s hierarchy of reading progresses, Isabella Thorpe, who is depicted as 
an insincere and greedy manipulator, reads extensively, demonstrating that—as Locke 
argues in Conduct— not all reading is constructive; through Isabella, Austen makes clear 
that judicious reading is as much about the mind brought to a book as it is about the text 
itself. After Isabella has first introduced Catherine to Mysteries of Udolpho, she exclaims 
that “when you have finished Udolpho, we will read the Italian together; and I have made 
out a list of ten or twelve more of the same kind for you” (Austen 24). However, this 
substantial knowledge of popular literature means little when reading for consumption 
rather than for “Truth and Certainty” (Locke 193). In her brief analysis of reading in 
Northanger Abbey, Barbara Benedict argues that “Isabella models the cynical use of 
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literature as fashionable display, a commodity to be conspicuously consumed, rather than 
a resource to consult for self-improvement” (4). While Catherine eventually discovers the 
truth of everyday societal greed through her reading of Udolpho, Isabella, who lets greed 
rule her actions—much like Madame Cheron of Mysteries of Udolpho or Sir George of 
Quixote— learns nothing of herself or society. As Locke notes in his Conduct, “Some 
people are assiduous in reading, but don’t advance their knowledge much by it” because 
they fail to “reflect...[and] so they are little improved (14). Isabella, the mindless 
consumer, reads voraciously but learns little from the act because she fails to compare her 
read material to knowledge of the world. This superficial reading is exemplified by 
Catherine’s and Isabella’s conversations about books. When Catherine reveals that she 
and her mother both enjoy Sir Charles Grandison, Isabella responds in outrage, naming 
one of Austen’s favorite novels as an “amazing horrid book” (Austen 26). As the 
conversation continues, Isabella’s ineffectual mind only becomes more apparent:  
‘Do you indeed! You surprise me; I thought [Sir Charles Grandison] had not been 
readable. But, my dearest Catherine, have you settled what to wear on your head 
tonight? I am determined at all events to be dressed exactly like you. The men 
take notice of that sometimes, you know.’ (Austen 26) 
Rather than conversing about Udolpho or Sir Charles Grandison and acquiring 
knowledge from a didactic dialogue with Catherine, Isabella swiftly changes the subject 
to more trivial yet entertaining matters: clothes and men. As Wollstonecraft notes, 
imaginative books, like romance or the Gothic, “ought not to be read before the judgment 
is formed, or at least exercised” (Education 49). Isabella, with what Benedict describes as 
“fast and shallow”(2) reading for consumption, fails to be transformed by her reading 
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because she herself does not transform her reading into useful knowledge through 
reflection and judgment.  
The more loathsome consequence of uneducated reading, however, is the lack of 
“self” Isabella continually demonstrates. Much like Mrs. Allen’s, Isabella’s discourse is 
saturated with meaningless and insincere chatter; however, rather than molding her 
identity to fit a husband's ideology, Isabella shapes herself into the quintessential 
sentimental heroine, one who speaks to please. As Rousseau argues, “A man says what 
he knows; a woman says what pleases. He needs knowledge to speak; she needs taste” 
(376); Isabella embodies this patriarchal notion indiscriminately, speaking only what 
pleases. For instance, after arriving home from a day of exploration with the Morlands 
and her brother, Isabella demonstrates her embodiment of the sentimental “love and 
marriage” plot where the heroine adopts the hero as her center: 
[T]he astonishment of Isabella was hardly to be expressed, on finding that it was 
too late in the day for them to attend her friend into the house: —”Past three 
o’clock!” it was inconceivable, incredible, impossible! and she would neither 
believe her own watch, nor her brother’s, nor the servant’s; she would believe no 
assurance of it founded on reason or reality; till Morland produced his watch, and 
ascertained the fact; to have doubted a moment longer then, would have been 
equally inconceivable, incredible, and impossible. (Austen 45)  
Isabella’s use of overly sentimental language and complete lack of “reason or reality” 
both embody the insincere masculine depiction of women. Like Mrs. Allen, Isabella 
accepts the word of James Morland because the pursuit of him has become her focus and 
she works to please him. The incapable Isabella—reading without “examination,” 
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“judgement,” or “attention”—falls into the male-centric trap set for women. She has read 
the Gothic without seeing the truth masked beneath Radcliffe’s language and, 
consequently, adopts artifice over agency. Though Isabella is an ineffectual reader, of 
both life and literature, her Gothic reading has granted her something that Mrs. Allen 
does not have, the drive to advance her financial situation through the means the 
sentimental has given, marriage. Throughout the novel, Isabella molds herself into 
whatever sentimental trope is needed to advance her own goals: doting friend, a guide to 
Catherine, adoring fiancée, and, when the time comes, pursuer of Captain Tilney’s 
fortune. Because Isabella uses deceit and masculine writing as inspiration for her 
machinations, she inevitably finds failure. In her characterization of Isabella, Austen 
illustrates that reading without a mind for truth leaves women with a false sense of the 
world and will lead to ultimate failure; however, a more lasting result of this reading is an 
inability to educate one’s mind to create an authentic self. Isabella, as Cordóón makes 
plain, “is a creature of her culture, her every word follows the socially sanctioned script 
for women” (48).  
As the third tier of Austen’s literary hierarchy, the intelligent Eleanor Tilney 
seems initially to remedy the educational problems characteristic to women like Isabella 
Thorpe and Mrs. Allen; however, Eleanor is representative of the ideal woman and, thus, 
by definition she must both adhere to and propagate society’s feminine constructs. From 
her entrance into the novel, the narrator demarcates Eleanor as the patriarchally 
constructed, prototypical British woman, the standard that Catherine is compared against. 
This is apparent from the narrator’s first sketch of Eleanor’s person, character, and moral 
virtue:   
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Miss Tilney had a good figure, a pretty face, and a very agreeable countenance; 
and her air, though it had not all the decided pretension, the resolute stylishness of 
Miss Thorpe's, had more real elegance. Her manners showed good sense and good 
breeding; they were neither shy nor affectedly open; and she seemed capable of 
being young, attractive, and at a ball without wanting to fix the attention of every 
man near her, and without exaggerated feelings of ecstatic delight or 
inconceivable vexation on every little trifling occurrence. (Austen 36-7)  
Reminiscent of Rousseau’s foil to Emile—Sophia—Miss Tilney is in perfect balance; she 
is neither too weak of mind to be silly, like Miss Glanville or Thorpe, nor too strong of 
mind to be “unsexed,” like Wollstonecraft. But this patriarchally compelled equilibrium 
nullifies Eleanor’s self and has important implications for Austen’s educational 
argument. According to Ellen Jordan, despite the surge in female educationalists who 
advocated for more equitable female learning, well into the nineteenth century it was 
accepted still that the end product of female education was “good wives and mothers” 
(439). Here, Austen recognizes that by engendering women like Eleanor Tilney, the 
dominant culture solidifies its power because as mothers, such women will morally 
instruct their children while also submitting to their constrained roles.  
Austen’s social commentary on the educational shortcomings of such women as 
Eleanor is perhaps most apparent in her choice of reading material; by exploring the 
male-dominated histories, which contain few examples of agent or educated women, 
Eleanor alienates herself and, thus, cannot transform her learning into self-realization. It 
is apparent from even a cursory reading of Northanger Abbey that Eleanor is “the best-
educated woman in the novel, with the clearest grasp on the real position of women in 
English Society” (Zlotnick 285). Further, it is undeniable that in wit, understanding, and 
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experience, Eleanor is far superior to the newly emerged and naive Catherine; however, 
Eleanor’s literary learning pales in comparison to Catherine’s subversive and 
transformative reading. This is not to say that Catherine has more of “the materials of 
knowledge” than does Eleanor but that, as will be plain through our analysis of 
Catherine’s reading, Eleanor’s contemplation of her reading is incomplete and, as a 
result, she gains “little true benefit [from] history” (Locke, Conduct 188). In her article 
on female agency in Northanger Abbey, Susan Zlotnick argues that Eleanor’s 
“commitment to the ‘non-fictional’ narratives of male historians offers her no models of 
women as historical actors” (280). As Catherine herself points out, in history, “the men 
[are] all so good for nothing, and [there are] hardly any women at all” (Austen 74). While 
Lennox’s Arabella gains authority by creating “histories” out of French romances, 
Eleanor relinquishes hers to the tide of patriarchal opinion regarding female power. 
Without novels—vessels of emerging ideology—Eleanor lacks the feminine model of 
advancement found in fiction and, thus, is bogged down by the knowledge of her menial 
place in society. As she tells Catherine while at Northanger Abbey, “[Y]ou must have 
been long enough in this house to see that I am but a nominal mistress of it, that my real 
power is nothing” (Austen 166). Of all of the women in Northanger Abbey, Eleanor is the 
most aware of the patriarchal status quo, perhaps because, as will be demonstrated later, 
she lives under the thumb of General Tilney, the novelistic stand-in for dominant culture. 
However, knowledge, in this case, does not grant power but instead renders Eleanor 
frozen by the sheer weight of her awareness; this is what male-centric reading teaches 
women, acceptance of the dominant discourse. Eleanor’s paralysis is not present in Mrs. 
Allen, who is too uninformed to recognize her predicament; in Isabella, who sees the 
possibility of forward mobility in the flawed sentimental depictions of women; or even in 
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Catherine, who is in the process of learning the ways of society. Only Eleanor Tilney, a 
reader of male-centric histories, comprehends the true nature of women’s dependency 
and subsequent inability to construct a feminine self; however, as will be seen, Catherine 
Morland eventually breaks this restraint.  
The Reading of Catherine Morland: Perfecting Lennox’s Quixotic Education  
When Austen is rightfully placed within the quixotic tradition, Northanger Abbey, 
by the nature of its form, becomes a text about woman’s educational growth. Further, 
Austen adapts Lennox’ particular model of quixotism, improving upon The Female 
Quixote to grant, at least by modern standards, a more critically satisfactory end for her 
heroine. Rather than depicting an intelligent woman who makes overt, ridiculous 
misperceptions, like Arabella, Austen fashions Catherine, who progressively learns and 
develops through an intentional, harmonious blend of both reading and experience. As 
Catherine’s education advances, Austen, in place of a heroine who is quickly 
rehabilitated by a Lockean doctor, deliberately molds a heroine capable of implementing 
her own rehabilitation. Thus, by carefully reading the women around her as well as 
Gothic fiction, Catherine synthesizes the three models of female learning presented by 
Mrs. Allen, Isabella, and Eleanor Tilney, to construct her own authentic and emerging 
understanding of the world.  
Before the edifying growth of Catherine, Austen’s most capable reader, can be 
demonstrated, she must first be established as an anti-heroine, a character who 
destabilizes masculine stereotypes; juxtaposition of Catherine against both Emilie St. 
Aubert of Udolpho and Arabella of Quixote reveals the subversive nature of Austen’s 
“heroine.” Unlike most sentimental heroines, Catherine does not successfully participate 
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in the “elegant arts” of music, drawing, or any other feminine pastime (Radcliffe 8). In 
the first chapter of Udolpho, Radcliffe describes her heroine thus:   
Adjoining the eastern side of the green-house… was a room, which Emily called 
hers, and which contained her books, her drawings, her musical instruments, with 
some favorite birds and plants. Here she usually exercised herself in the elegant 
arts, cultivated only because they were congenial to her taste, and in which native 
genius… made her an early proficient. (8) 
Like Arabella’s unparalleled wit and virtue, it seems there is something inherently 
prodigious about Emilie. Through her sentimental pursuits, Emilie fully subscribes to the 
male-centric idea of what an accomplished young woman should be. Despite the sex of 
Radcliffe, she has, like many before her, produced writing grounded firmly in socially 
constructed stereotypes, and, therefore, any political truths found in her Gothic fiction are 
veiled by the patriarchal language it employs. Claudia Johnson argues that during this 
time “effectual dissent on the subject of sexual difference…was downright dangerous”; 
thus, this artificially gendered approach was not uncommon (19). Austen, on the other 
hand, undermines male-centric ideas of femininity by placing her “self” into Northanger 
Abbey and the character of Catherine Morland. In contrast to Emilie, Catherine’s first 
description overtly contradicts the prototypical heroine:   
Catherine was fond of all boys’ plays, and greatly preferred cricket not merely to 
dolls, but to the more heroic enjoyments of infancy, nursing a dormouse, feeding 
a canary-bird, or watering a rose-bush. Indeed she had no taste for a garden; and if 
she gathered flowers at all, it was chiefly for the pleasure of mischief. (Austen 5)  
104 
 
Here, Austen markedly delineates the difference between her writing and the tradition 
against which she argues. Where Radcliffe composes a heroine who is well-versed in the 
feminine arts, Austen opposes this tradition by subverting expectations. Immediately 
Austen informs the reader that Catherine will not fit within the sentimental mold of 
masculine writing; she will be something different that only the informed reader will 
understand.  
  This blatant departure from more traditional constructions of femininity is 
equally apparent when we compare Catherine’s “natural” disposition against both 
Arabella and the ideal woman. Catherine’s accomplishments are painted, intentionally so, 
in sharp contrast to the natural superiority of Arabella; Austen’s heroine, however, is 
“plain as any” (Austen 5). Aside from detesting traditional sentimental pursuits and 
favoring “boys’ play,” Catherine’s parentage and her subsequent upbringing are also 
markedly different than that of Arabellas. Where Arabella boasts a highborn father, a 
dead mother, and a rich country estate, Catherine is one of ten children in a “very plain” 
family that does not take particularly close care in the education of their children. Despite 
the perceived inferiority of the Morland family, the narrator does note that Catherine’s 
father, thankfully, “was not in the least addicted to locking up his daughters” (5). Thus, 
among a slew of differences between the two heroines’ upbringing, Austen denotes 
experience as the most significant variance. Further, Catherine is presented in opposition 
not only to romantic heroines—who too often, intentionally or not, embody the dominant 
discourse—but also to the cultural ideal of “woman.” As Rousseau so elegantly attests, 
“Nothing in this world is more disgusting than an unclean woman” (395). In her article 
on “Dirty Girls” and “Dirty Books” within Austen’s fiction, Kathy Justice Gentle argues 
that Catherine Morland’s love of dirt classifies her as subversive, just as Elizabeth 
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Bennett’s tromp through the mud signifies her independence. Placed within the context of 
Catherine’s overtly unfeminine characterization, this seems likely; however, with the 
models of Emilie, Arabella, and the ideal woman looming in the background, Catherine is 
denoted as something different than merely “dirty.” Rather, her model of femininity sets 
aside eighteenth-century society’s restrictive notions of the ideal woman, and instead 
depicts something attainable and truly natural to woman.  
 Importantly, it is not only Catherine’s language, unfeminine pursuits, and 
upbringing that differentiate her from traditional heroines but also the singular nature of 
her education, which expressly uses Locke’s notion of ideas to reinvent the feminine 
heroine—specifically in juxtaposition to Lennox’s Arabella. Reminiscent of Lennox in 
The Female Quixote, Austen also begins with the retelling of her “heroine’s” early 
education; however, where Arabella has a talent for every pursuit she undertakes, 
Catherine “never could learn or understand anything before she was taught” (Austen 6). 
Through Austen’s portrayal of Catherine’s “learning,” it is clear that Catherine is initially 
described in accordance to absence whereas Arabella is defined by presence; to rephrase, 
while Lennox speaks to the naturally talented disposition of Arabella, denoting all of her 
many intellectual and material accomplishments, Austen emphasizes the traits in which 
her heroine is lacking. For example, she cannot draw, sing, play music, read, or speak 
French well (5-7). As Juliet McMaster posits in her article on Catherine Morland, 
Austen’s heroine is “described largely in negatives,” which style her as a void waiting to 
be filled (19). Reminiscent of Locke’s categorization of the mind as a “vast store,” 
McMaster argues that 
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[a]s with Catherine’s ‘uniformed mind,’ we have the metaphors of the brain as a 
closet or a suitcase, which may be well stocked with ideas, or bulging with junk, 
or disappointingly lightweight, devastatingly empty” (19).     
Though Locke is not mentioned in her analysis, and, therefore, the connection might be 
unintentional, McMaster’s appraisal of Catherine nevertheless creates an interesting 
Lockean argument: If Catherine is indeed a blank page, an empty store, then, even more 
so than Lennox’s Arabella, she is the prototypical Lockean model. Through her literary 
and experiential development, she is able gradually to obtain, evaluate, and judge 
knowledge as she experiences society; thus, Austen’s subversive heroine emerges from 
the Lockean conception of the mind and ideas.   
As a reader, however, Catherine Morland does not immediately contradict 
stereotypes; although Austen utilizes “feminine writing” to characterize Catherine at the 
end of Northanger Abbey, Catherine initially reads as a sentimental heroine does, poorly 
without self-reflection. Before her societal education has begun, Catherine’s reading 
abilities subscribe to the tenets of “the fast and shallow acquisition of a wide variety of 
texts,” which were packaged by men for female consumption (Benedict 2). During 
Chapter One, without giving any context, Catherine quotes in quick succession 
Shakespeare, Pope, Gray, and Thompson—all of whom are, uncoincidentally, quoted in 
Radcliffe’s Mysteries of Udolpho. Catherine did not learn these quotations by reflective 
reading that would inform her mind but only knows them to be “serviceable” for 
heroines, quotations that could have been picked up in eighteenth-century quotation 
books (Austen 7). Benedict argues that “[f]rom these recontextualized literary snippets 
Catherine is intended to learn to value sentimentality and to use books to nourish feeling” 
(3). Further, Catherine’s use of quotation books reveals that the constricting force of 
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dominant culture, as analyzed in previous sections, is present within Catherine’s home as 
well. However, the lessons learned from Isabella, Mrs. Allen, and Eleanor remind us that 
this reading leads not to true feminine education but to complete absence of identity. 
Despite the disappointing nature of Catherine’s male-centric reading, it is the foundation 
of Catherine’s learning process, and it introduces (with subtle allusions to Radcliffe) 
Austen’s satire of the Gothic, an indispensable tool for Catherine’s eventual discovery of 
societal truth.  
Though Catherine’s ability to read both situations and texts improves with her 
exposure to the world of Bath and Udolpho, this intellectual progression has not yet 
developed into an intelligence worthy of an authentic “feminine” heroine. To counteract 
this deficiency, Catherine, unlike the other female characters, is capable of learning a new 
way to read and, consequently, can learn to educate herself.  Joanne Cordóón states, 
“Having escaped the traditional pursuits for girls, Catherine has not been warped into an 
artificial social female” —like Emilie St. Aubert, other female readers of Northanger, or  
even Arabella—and is, therefore, able to mold herself into a “solid young woman” (44). 
During the Bath volume of the novel, this idea is solidified by Catherine’s burgeoning 
reading. Moving past the surface level reading of Chapter One, Catherine is now 
completely engrossed by Udolpho:   
Catherine was then left to the luxury of a raised, restless, and frightened 
imagination over the pages of Udolpho, lost from all worldly concerns of dressing 
and dinner, incapable of soothing Mrs. Allen’s fears on the delay of an expected 
dressmaker. (Austen 51) 
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Where before Catherine enjoyed books only if “nothing like useful knowledge could be 
gained from them, provided they were all story and no reflections,” now she is 
intellectually absorbed in her reading (7). Benedict sees this flourishing literary mind as a 
contrast to the Thorpes’, who read so shallowly that they cannot commit themselves to 
expansive texts like Richardson’s Sir Charles Grandison or Burney’s Camilla. Though 
this is undoubtedly true, more importantly, Catherine both loses the meaningless 
pleasantries of society in the pursuit of proper reading and furthers her ability to read in a 
proper Lockean way. “Dressing,” “Dinner,” and “Dressmaker,” the stereotypical 
distractions of a well-possessed woman, are unimportant when compared to the lessons 
of Udolpho. Here, her consuming and thoughtful reading begins to resemble Arabella’s; 
however, Catherine’s simultaneous access to both reading and experience allows a more 
moderate yet self-driven education, which, as Austen demonstrates, is more authentic. 
Significantly, Catherine’s newfound ability to read deeply directly corresponds 
with her improved reading of society’s flaws, a clear signal of her improving feminine 
education and embodiment of Lockean reading. Even before Catherine has reached 
Northanger and she is engulfed in Gothic delusion, she “gradually begins to see people as 
they are, not as they are officially classified in society” (Mathison 143). This emerging 
consciousness is especially true when applied to Catherine’s changing perception of 
Isabella Thorpe. Where once Isabella invoked “powerful admiration” from Catherine 
who was “grateful… for the chance” to “procure such a friend,” now Catherine questions 
Isabella’s motives and integrity (Austen 20). As Catherine’s literary education continues, 
she can perceive the difference between sentimental speech and a person’s contradictory 
actions, unlike Arabella in her dealings with Sir George. Though Mysteries of Udolpho is 
grounded in masculine language and, therefore, cannot reach its full feminine potential, it 
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does demonstrate the deception of society, a deception to which Catherine is awakening. 
At the commencement of Volume II, Isabella says, “It is not on my own account I wish 
for more [money]; but I cannot bear to be the means of injuring my dear Morland”; 
however, Catherine’s “uncomfortable feelings” warn her otherwise (93). These feelings 
of uncertainty, which are eventually eased by Isabella’s reassurances, mark the results of 
Catherine’s literary education and consequent maturation. At this point, Catherine does 
not yet see Isabella’s real character or even understand what she feels, but she is made 
uncomfortable by the contradictions in speech and actions she perceives; these feelings 
are later transferred to Captain Tilney as Catherine's Gothic delusions move her further 
toward the discovery of “truth.” By carefully reading and observing, Catherine has both 
surpassed Arabella in readerly understanding and also ventured towards Locke’s “true 
Key” of reading.      
 Despite the disunity many critics have perceived in Northanger Abbey because of 
Catherine’s Gothic delusions, Austen utilizes the Gothic to teach Catherine the truth of 
fiction. Again, the betterment of reading leads directly to an understanding of societal 
truth, and comprehending the constructs of society is the only means to create a sense of 
self that functions outside said constructs; thus, Catherine’s growth as a reader, through 
the Gothic, is vital to Austen’s creation of her educational argument. However, this 
argument is not observed by all critics. Benedict sees Catherine’s Gothic illusion as “a 
literary invention that ignores context and probability for impression and sensation” (3). 
In actuality, this interpretation “ignores” the truthful lessons Catherine gains from her slip 
into fantasy and, consequently, revokes the literary freedom that Catherine has gained. 
Northanger Abbey, if nothing else, is a tale of learning, and learning necessitates mistakes 
to gain knowledge, as Locke’s SCTE outlines clearly. In fact, Austen uses the word 
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“learn” thirty times in her 170-page novel, drawing attention to the intellectual process 
Catherine undertakes. Creating a feminine education that functions outside the dominant 
ideology is not simply done; however, Catherine demonstrates its possibilities through 
her accusations against General Tilney.  In her work, Jane Austen: Women, Politics, and 
the Novel, Claudia Johnson argues that Catherine can make these revelations because she 
is “unencumbered by the elaborate properties that tie the hands of Gothic heroines, is free 
to make blunt declarations and to ask embarrassing questions that expose the duplicity 
and the deficiency of those on whom innocence such as her own ought to rely” (47). In 
essence, the authentic language that differentiates Catherine from other heroines is also 
what allows for Catherine’s self-education. Further, Catherine’s unapologetic questioning 
of authoritative figures signifies her unwillingness, as Locke provokes in his readers, to 
accept social custom on faith alone: Catherine’s social consciousness is emerging.  
 In Volume II, the primary source of Catherine’s education is the repressive force 
of General Tilney who is himself “Gothic” in his ability to stifle the potential of women. 
At first, Catherine cannot understand the relief she feels when out of the General’s 
presence: “He turned away; and Catherine was shocked to find how much her spirits were 
relieved by the separation. The shock however being less real than the relief, offered it no 
injury; and began to talk with easy gaiety” (Austen 123). As her Gothic delusions build 
on her discomfort and her subversive ideas emerge, Catherine’s relief is transformed into 
outright suspicion. Mysteries of Udolpho has taught Catherine the repressive effect that 
greedy men—like Signor Montoni or Sir George—can legally have upon a dependent 
woman; however, Catherine is not yet intellectually ready to admit the social reality of 
greed and, therefore, confronts it within the medium she understands, the Gothic. Rather 
than recognizing “the moral and physical coercion” that Mrs. Tilney must have 
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experienced at the hands of General Tilney, Catherine pulls the Gothic into “the daytime 
world of manners, where it can be shown,” eventually, “for the everyday occurrence it is” 
(Johnson 37).20  
Though Catherine has progressed as a reader, before she can reach her full 
potential she must transcend the appearance of societal truth in order to accept the reality 
that fiction presents, thus completing her literary education. When Catherine first realizes 
that the mystery she concocts around Mrs. Tilney’s death is false, she is utterly abashed, 
and the narrator states, “The visions of romance were over. Catherine was completely 
awaked” (Austen 136). Here, Catherine has temporarily abandoned her true “illusions”; 
however, the doublespeak of the narrator foreshadows her eventual realizations. General 
Tilney is only kind to Catherine because he desires the (nonexistent) fortune he imagines 
her to have. As soon as the folly of his assumption is revealed, the true greed of General 
Tilney comes to light. This is the scary truth of the Gothic, a truth that transcends the 
masculine language it is presented in, a truth that Catherine discovers. Gothic fiction 
pulls from the legal realities woman faced and depicts a world “where a father can be a 
British subject, a Christian, a respectable citizen, and a ruthless and mean-spirited tyrant” 
who “in some legitimate sense of the term can ‘kill’” a woman slowly through socially 
accepted repression, disallowing any sense of identity (C. Johnson 40). Yes, when 
General Tilney places Catherine in that carriage without warning or explanation, 
“romance” is gone and she is “awakened”; however, she is not awakened to her own folly 
but has become aware of the fictitious nature of her societal constructs, and, as a result, 
                                                             
20 Interestingly, both Janine Barchus and Claire Tomalin make different yet compelling cases for Austen’s 
being aware of real life and contemporary atrocities that resembled Gothic fiction. Further, Barchus argues 
that Northanger Abbey revolves around a very specific location and family, both of which have scandalous 
histories.    
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comes to accept the realities of the Gothic. Through Catherine’s juxtaposition of 
experiences against reading, she observes, reflects, and judges what she reads against the 
fabric of life; in so doing, she gains the “true key of books, and the clue to lead [her] 
through the mizmaze of variety of opinions and authors to truth and certainty” (Locke, 
Conduct 193). In comparison to Arabella, whose rehabilitation is sudden and primarily 
external, this gradual self-sufficient maturation is both more fulfilling for Catherine and, 
for contemporary readers, rendered a feasible rather than ideal model of woman.    
At the conclusion of Northanger Abbey, Catherine Morland is educated in reading 
literature effectively and, by extension, reading the unpleasant truths of English society. 
When she leaves home, she is as “free from the apprehension of evil as from the 
knowledge of it,” but she arrives back wondering how “three months ago had seen her all 
this; and now, how altered a being did she return” (Austen 163). However, Catherine’s 
education has allowed not only the realization of truth but also a creation of a feminine 
self. Austen, in a powerful expression of emerging ideology, grants her heroine the power 
of choice, reversing the traditional role of women’s being not “initiators of their own 
choice, but rather receivers of men’s” (C. Johnson 36). When Henry Tilney comes to find 
Catherine at her home, the narrator informs the reader,  
Henry was now sincerely attached to her, though he felt and delighted in all the 
excellencies of her character and truly loved her society, I must confess that his 
affection originated in nothing better than gratitude, or, in other words, that a 
persuasion of her partiality for him had been the only cause of giving her a serious 
thought. It is a new circumstance in romance, I acknowledge, and dreadfully 
derogatory of [a] heroine’s dignity; but if it be as new in common life, the credit 
of a wild imagination will at least be all my own (168).  
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Catherine, unlike the sentimental heroines of her time, is granted the power of choice 
and, therefore, does not conform to the will of a man. Much like the one Locke promotes 
and the one that Arabella herself achieves, Catherine’s marriage is entered into gradually 
and willingly on both sides, a biproduct of choice not necessity. In having the narrator 
call attention to her subversive ending, Austen simultaneously grants Catherine the power 
to create a self and solidifies the influence of a “true” proper education. Through a study 
of feminine reading and its political consequences, Northanger Abbey truly does become 
something “new.” 
Medusa’s Daughter: Female Authenticity in Austen’s Conception of Catherine  
Though Lennox did something both remarkable and exceptional with The Female 
Quixote, the language and method that she employed masked Arabella in traditionally 
masculine language; contrariwise, Catherine, in almost every aspect of her character, 
subverts the dominant ideology of “woman” and, therfore, creates an authentic 
conception of the female self. When Northanger Abbey is recognized as Helene Cixous’ 
“feminine writing,” the radical content of Austen’s work is even more evident, and 
reading is further highlighted as a tool of dissent. In her landmark text The Laugh of the 
Medusa, Cixous argues that most writing, no matter the sex of the author, is grounded in 
patriarchal language and, therefore, the “workmanship” of female writing “is in no way 
different from male writing” (878).  In order for a text to be truly feminine, Cixous argues 
that woman must place her “self” into the writing:   
Woman must write her self: must write about women and bring women to writing, 
from which they have been driven away as violently as from their bodies—for the 
same reasons, by the same law, with the same fatal goal. Woman must put herself 
into the text—as into the world and into history—by her own movement. (875)  
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To accomplish this task, the female author must recapture and repurpose language for the 
creation of “feminine writing” that depicts “woman” faithfully. This rewriting of the 
dominant ideology is essential for the advancement of women because, as Cixous says, 
writing is “the space that can serve as a springboard for subversive thought, the 
precursory movement of a transformation of social cultural structures” (879). 
Importantly, Cixous also sagely notes that a woman must place “her self” in writing, not 
herself; this is to say, the very essence of the woman writer, free from social constructs  
or dominant  ideologies, should be written into the work. This connectivity between 
literature and the creation of a “self” permeates Austen’s work. It seems that Austen, with 
her veiled commentary on female reading, education, and the self, perceives the political 
importance that writing holds and utilizes it thusly. In fact, Joanne Cordóón argues that 
Northanger Abbey “challenges misogynistic rhetorical norms for women” and, thus, 
invents “the impregnable language that will wreck partitions, classes, and rhetorics,” 
successfully creating “feminine writing” (Cordóón 41; Cixous 866).  
 Throughout the Bath and Gothic volumes of Northanger Abbey, Austen’s 
narrator repeatedly emphasizes how Catherine Morland subverts the expectations of a 
sentimental heroine, a heroine who embodies male-centric ideology. As Catherine moves 
through the challenges of maturation, her actions, and, more importantly, her language 
remain “free of ‘feminine’ evasions” and, therefore, “reflect her actual desires rather than 
her culture’s opinion of what they should be” (Cordóón 44). Though Cordóón’s 
classification of Northanger Abbey as “feminine writing” is capably argued, she 
exclusively focuses on the juxtaposition of Catherine’s sincere language against the 
culturally manufactured discourse employed by characters like Mrs. Allen, Isabella, and 
Eleanor Tilney. By excluding both Austen’s use of the quixotic model to educate her 
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heroine and also her employment of Locke’s individualistic ideas, Cordóón misses the 
political implications of Austen’s statement: The authentic woman—educated in both 
literature and experience, taught to compare book-learning and actual experiences against 
one another in pursuit of truth—is the ideal woman because she is self-actualized, not 
constructed.  
Despite the many arguments claiming the disunity of Austen’s Northanger Abbey, 
viewing the two volumes as “feminine writing” on the importance of female education 
unifies the text and creates a cohesion traditionally seen as lacking. Through Austen’s 
hierarchy, ineffective feminine readers —like Mrs. Allen, Isabella, and Eleanor—
illustrate how a deficiency of reading corresponds to inadequate education and ultimately 
results in the adoption of society’s feminine constructs. If individuals cannot see the 
falsely constructed nature of social expectation, they will conform; as a result, one is 
unable to form a self that does not mirror society’s false ideology. However, the 
antithesis of this dilemma is depicted in the character of Catherine. Because she rejects 
feminine tropes and does not lose her identity in the absorption of a male-centric ideal, 
Catherine’s literacy grows. Where she begins Northanger Abbey as a skim-and-quote 
reader, an in-depth reading of Mysteries of Udolpho and the careful observation of female 
exemplars enhance her feminine education and allow her to discover political truth within 
fiction. Though some scholars, like Benedict, view Northanger as a cautionary tale 
against reading sentimental Gothic novels, this analysis does not recognize that 
Catherine’s reading of Udolpho is a commentary on the educational debate of the age. 
Thus, it is through Catherine Morland’s quixotic learning that Austen contributes her 
voice to the political conversation regarding female reading. Because of Catherine’s 
growing literacy, she discovers the absurdity of women’s preoccupation with trivial 
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matters, and she learns about the sexual politics of female subordination. This knowledge 
ultimately allows her to choose her husband and rupture the “feminine” roles that bind 
her. As the epitome of the judicious feminine reader in Northanger Abbey, Catherine 
demonstrates how an authentic feminine education enables women to construct a self that 
functions outside of the dominant culture’s false consciousness, making Austen’s earliest 
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